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Abstract 
The Peoples Republic of China’s Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, or eastern Central 
Asia, is an area that has recently seen large scale ethnic unrest, as the native Uygurs have 
protested violently against Chinese domination in the region. This thesis is a discussion of the 
background for why Xinjiang today is under Chinese rule. To and a half centuries ago, in 
1755-59, the Manchu Qing dynasty (1636-1911) conquered Xinjiang and incorporated it into 
their state, and this conquest contributed significantly to Xinjiang’s present status as Chinese-
ruled territory. In this thesis I discuss what motives might have driven this Central Asian 
expansion by the Qing. By employing a theoretical framework that focuses on five types of 
motives for state expansion, namely resources, commerce, overpopulation, security, and 
ideology, I examine the Qing annexation of Xinjiang comparatively with the Russian 
Empire’s policies toward western Central Asia (the Central Asian segment that the Russians 
ended up expanding into, and which today is known as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and conclude that the Qing expansion was primarily the 
result of ideological motives. The reason was that the state which ruled Xinjiang at the time, 
the Junghar Khanate, had close relations with the Tibetan Buddhist establishment, which was 
an establishment that the Manchus depended on in order to keep their state intact. The Qing 
was therefore determined to conquer Xinjiang and eradicate its ideological adversary. 
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Note on Transliteration 
Because this thesis contains maps from Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, vol. 
9, Handbook of Oriental Studies: Section Eight: Central Asia (Leiden: Brill, 2003), I have 
tried to make all names and terms, from no matter what language, as consistent as possible 
with these maps. This means, for example, that I write “Junghar” instead of “Zunghar” or 
“Dzunghar” (and therefore “Jungharia” instead of “Zungharia or “Dzungharia”), “Qazaq” 
instead of “Kazakh,” “Qalmïq” instead of “Kalmyk,” “Tien-shan” instead of “Tianshan,” 
“Sïr-Darya” instead of “Syr-Darya” or “Syr Darya,” “Altïshar” instead of “Altishahr,” and 
“Altay” instead of “Altai” (though I still write “Dalai Lama” instead of “Dalai-Lama”). As for 
names and terms that do not show on his maps, I have mostly followed Peter C. Perdue, 
China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Studies 
of Nationalities in the USSR (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), or Walter G. 
Moss, A History of Russia, vol. 1: To 1917 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997). For Chinese 
names and terms I employ the Pinyin system of transliteration. 
I ought to inform that I have taken the somewhat unorthodox approach of altering names 
and terms in quotes so as to achieve consistency with the rest of the thesis. The changed name 
or term is then written with [brackets] around it. This is done because it makes the text more 
readable, and also because it does not force people to read several different transliterations of 
the same name or term. 
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1 Introduction: Framework, 
Definitions, and Sources 
Central Asia is a part of the world which traditionally has received little attention in the 
Norwegian media. Although most Norwegians no doubt have a vague idea about where the 
region is situated, it seems fair to say that the Norwegian public usually has been unaware of 
what has been happening here. 
This situation is now slowly changing, however, at least when it comes to the eastern part 
of Central Asia, which is the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region in the Peoples Republic of 
China (see Map 1).1 As is suggested by the name, Xinjiang is home to the Uygurs, a Muslim 
people who constitutes one of the 56 minority peoples in China. In the last one or two 
decades, however, the Uygurs have become increasingly unhappy with Chinese rule and the 
escalating number of Han Chinese immigrants in Xinjiang, seeing the latter as threatening to 
their culture. As a consequence of this, many Uygurs have resorted to sometimes violent 
protests in order to voice their grievances. For example, four days before China was to 
arrange the Olympic Games in August of 2008, two individuals (whom the Chinese 
government claimed were Uygurs) attacked a police station in Kashghar, killing 16 policemen 
and wounding 16 others. About a year later, in the summer of 2009, violent protests erupted 
in the city of Urumchi (the capital of Xinjiang), when perhaps as many as 3000 Uygurs rose 
in revolt by showing their dismay against the Chinese, resulting in attacks on cars, buildings, 
and bystanders. Local Chinese citizens began to seek revenge against the Uygur protesters, 
and the city ended up becoming so chaotic and violent that large numbers of military forces 
had to be deployed in order to restore calm. In the course of all these events, probably 
hundreds of Uygurs lost their lives, and many more were arrested. Both the Kashghar attack 
and the Urumchi revolt received attention in the Norwegian media, and as a consequence of 
the latter Norwegian Uygurs also arranged a demonstration in Oslo.2 Xinjiang, then, has in 
the course of the last year become more visible also in Norway. 
                                                 
1 I give a more thorough definition of Central Asia later in this chapter. 
2 Jo Moen Bredeveien, Opprøret kveles, Dagsavisen AS, 09.07.2009, 
http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article425313.ece (accessed 07.10.2009); Jo Moen Bredeveien, Sammenstøt 
også i Oslo, Dagsavisen AS, 08.07.2009, http://www.dagsavisen.no/innenriks/article425105.ece (accessed 
06.10.2009); NTB, Fakta om Xinjiang-regionen og uigurene, Dagsavisen AS, 14.07.2009, 
http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article426324.ece (accessed 06.10.2009); NTB, Kaos og sammenstøt i 
Xinjiangs hovedstad, Dagsavisen AS, 07.07.2009, http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article425027.ece 
(accessed 07.10.2009); NTB, Kina: - Angrep del av hellig krig, Dagsavisen AS, 05.08.2008, 
http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article362499.ece (accessed 06.10.2009); Martin Skjæraasen, Frykter mer 
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As a consequence of this increased attention that Xinjiang has received, it is now timely to 
look at how and why the area ended up becoming a part of China in the first place. In fact, 
although the modern Chinese government claims that Xinjiang is an over 2000 year old part 
of the Chinese state,3 it was the Manchu Qing dynasty (1636-1911)4 and its eighteenth 
century conquest and subsequent rule of Xinjiang that is the main reason why the region is 
controlled from Beijing today.5 In 1690 the Manchus launched a war against the Junghar 
Khanate, the state that ruled Xinjiang from about 1680 until the Qing in 1755-59 invaded the 
region and annihilated it, and it is this expansion that is the main topic of this thesis. I will 
particularly focus on what motivated the Qing to take control over Xinjiang. Why did they 
need to expand into and take control over this territory? Why did they need to destroy the 
Junghar Khanate? 
In view of the fact that Xinjiang and Central Asia has been such a peripheral topic in 
Norwegian discourse, however, I ought perhaps to explain how I came to be interested in this 
region in the first place. It was actually through my long-lasting interest in China, and 
especially the history of China, that I first came to be introduced to Central Asia. My passion 
for Chinese history was perhaps the main reason why I applied for the bachelor program 
“Asian and African Studies” at the University of Oslo in the autumn of 2004. After being 
accepted into the program I chose East Asia and China as my area of study, with a major in 
history and additional courses in Chinese language. I soon found out, however, that beyond 
the initial entry level courses in East Asian history, there were few others that dealt with the 
history of China. This was particularly the case among the more advanced bachelor courses. 
When given the opportunity to select my own topic for the final bachelor thesis, therefore, I 
realized that now was an opportunity for writing about a subject from Chinese history. 
The problem was, however, to find out what subject I wanted to write about. The many 
preliminary suggestions that I sent to my supervisor Lars Harald Bøckmann spanned from as 
early as the Song period (960-1279) to as late as the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). After 
                                                                                                                                                        
vold, Dagsavisen AS, 07.07.2009, http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article424886.ece (accessed 06.10.2009); 
Kristian Skårdalsmo, Terrorangrep få dager før Kina-OL, Dagsavisen AS, 04.08.2008, 
http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article362355.ece (accessed 06.10.2009); Amund Trellevik, Kinas tikkende 
bombe, Dagsavisen AS, 08.07.2009, http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article425115.ece (accessed 
06.10.2009). 
3 James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), 4. 
4 Although the Qing period is usually set to begin in 1644, when the Qing dynasty replaced the Ming dynasty 
(1368-1644) in Beijing, it was in 1636 that the Qing was actually founded. 
5 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, "Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the 
Late Nineteenth Century," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr, Studies of Central 
Asia and the Caucasus (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 48-62. 
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some time I decided to settle on the Qing period, and eventually wrote a thesis titled 
“Consolidation, Conquest, and Expansion under the Kangxi Emperor.”6 Now, it was actually 
the Kangxi emperor (ruled 1662-1722) who was the Qing monarch that declared war on the 
Junghars in 1690, and even though he did not live long enough to see the conquest of 
Xinjiang carried through to the finish, it was nevertheless by studying for this thesis that I was 
given my first serious introduction to Xinjiang and the incorporation of this region into the 
Qing Empire. 
The present thesis, then, is in one sense a chronological continuation of my bachelor thesis, 
in that it follows the Qing conquest all the way through to 1759, and also looks at how the 
region was controlled in the years after its conclusion. It also employs a wider geographical 
perspective, in that it compares the Qing conquest of Xinjiang with the Russian Empire and 
its relationship with the Qazaq nomads in the other (or western) branch of Central Asia. This 
western Central Asian region is the area of modern Kazakhstan (which was were the Qazaq 
nomads resided), in addition to those of modern Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan (see Map 1), and although the Russian Empire conquered all of these lands in 
1822-84, it was the Qazaqs in Kazakhstan that experienced the most pressure from Russia in 
the eighteenth century (that is, in the same century as the Qing expansion into Xinjiang took 
place). It is therefore the Russian-Qazaq conflict that will be used as comparison partner for 
the Qing conflict with the Junghars. Since “the comparative approach serves the identification 
of problems and issues which would not be seen, or would be seen only with difficulty, 
without it”,7 I believe that it is a potentially fruitful undertaking to compare these two “duels” 
to each other. 
 
 
1.1 Motives for Political Expansion 
My thesis, then, covers vast amounts of both time and space, and it is therefore important to 
have a theoretical framework guiding the narrative. First let me clarify two important 
concepts. By motives I mean aims, goals, or objectives. I want to know what the Qing wanted 
with Central Asia. Why did the Manchus sacrifice state resources to put this territory under 
their political control? It should become clear then, that I focus less on means, or on how the 
                                                 
6 Thomas O. Løvold, "Konsolidering, erobring og ekspansjon under Kangxi-keiseren" (Bachelor thesis, 
University of Oslo, 2007). 
7 Jürgen Kocka, "The Uses of Comparative History," in Societies Made Up of History, ed. R. Björk and K. 
Molin (Akademitryck AB, 1996), 199. 
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Qing was able to expand. Both aspects (motives and means) are of course crucial. Without 
appropriate means, the Manchus wouldn’t have been able to expand into Central Asia at all, 
however much they would have liked to. When analyzing the causes for European overseas 
expansion in the fifteenth century, Carlo M. Cipolla identifies “the need to outflank the 
Muslim blockade and reach the Spice Islands”8 as one of the objectives, but notes that this 
“was already felt in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.”9 He also shows that there had in 
fact been earlier seafaring expeditions with this same goal in mind, but that these failed 
because “although there were ‘motives’, the necessary ‘means’ [that is, ships of good enough 
quality] were not available.”10 But it also works the other way around. In the first half of the 
fifteenth century, just before the Portuguese expansions began in earnest, the Ming dynasty 
(1368-1644) sent ships towards Southeast Asia, into the Indian Ocean and possibly as far 
afield as the East African coast. But the Ming eventually withdrew its fleets and destroyed 
them, and the seafaring expeditions came to an end. As J. R. S. Phillips eloquently put it, “the 
Chinese were far better equipped than Portugal or any other European nation to undertake a 
policy of overseas expansion…[but] they chose not to continue.”11 So, we may reverse 
Cipolla’s statement and say that although there were “means,” the necessary “motives” were 
not available. Therefore I would like to conclude that a search for motives for expansion can 
be just as significant as a search for means. 
When talking about expansion I’m referring to political expansion, which basically means 
when a state or political entity (in this case the Qing Empire) extend their political or 
administrative control over territory previously not so. This should therefore not be confused 
with economic expansion, which is when an “economical world” or Weltwirtschaft expands 
and links new regions into its own system. This economical world is usually bigger than a 
single political entity and, according to Fernand Braudell, has greater abilities to expand.12 
True, should one think of the Qing as an economical world, it can certainly be said that it 
expanded into Central Asia much before 1755, as trade between the Junghar Khanate and the 
Qing developed much before the invasions of this year. But unlike Braudell, which is of the 
                                                 
8 Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European 
Expansion 1400-1700 (Yuma, KA: Sunflower University Press, 1985), 18. 
9 Cipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires, 18. 
10 Cipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires, 18-19, quote from 18. 
11 J. R. S. Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe, Second ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), VIII, 
my emphasis. 
12 F. Braudel, "The Expansion of Europe and the 'Longue Durée'," in Expansion and Reaction: Essays on 
European Expansion and Reaction in Asia and Africa, ed. H. L. Wesseling, vol. 1, Comparative Studies in 
Overseas History (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1978), 20-22. 
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opinion that “political expansion does not last very long”,13 I would like to emphasize that the 
Qing (and also the Russian) political expansion into Central Asia was an event of great long-
term significance. Xinjiang, as we have seen, is today still a part of the Peoples Republic of 
China, the Qing Empire’s modern successor state, whereas Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became independent nation states only in 1991 with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the direct successor to the Russian Empire. Thus I am of 
the opinion that political expansion certainly can last very long, and that a search for its 
motives therefore is important. 
This thesis is therefore concerned with motives for political expansion. By drawing on 
literature concerned with perhaps the most studied expansion of all, namely that of Europe, I 
have tried to untangle the various motives that states might have for expanding their political 
borders, and have come to the conclusion that there are five main groups: 
 
Resources 
Should a state expand into an area with the intention of extracting its resources, be it stone, 
wood, silver, gold, furs, or oil, it would fall under this category. As is clear enough, a “state 
that controls a given area is entitled to exploit the resources that are contained therein.”14 An 
example of such a motivation may be found in the Russian expansion east across Siberia in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in which the primary motive appears to have been the 
acquisition of furs from the various animals that lived in this area (see Chapter 2). Another 
resource is of course humans, and the most infamous example of this motive for expansion is 
perhaps when the Europeans expanded into Africa in order to get slaves for their plantations 
in America.15 
 
Commerce 
A closely related motive is when a given territory and its peoples are seen as good targets for 
products produced in the expanding country. In general, the post-fifteenth century expansion 
                                                 
13 Braudel, "The Expansion of Europe," 21. 
14 Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, "Territorial Changes and Militarized Conflict," The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 104. 
15 For good secondary accounts on this topic see Philip D. Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation 
Complex: Essays in Atlantic History, Second ed., Studies in Comparative World History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade, New Approaches to the 
Americas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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of European states overseas may often have been a result of this objective.16 To give a more 
concrete example, when the French government proposed to conquer Algiers in the 1820s, 
they received backing from French merchants, “who saw an opportunity for procuring a new 
protected marked.”17 Also, when Russia in 1868-81 took control over Bukhara, Khiva, 
Qoqand, and the Turkmens in the Central Asia, one of their aims was “to gain markets for the 
products of Russia’s growing industry”.18 
 
Overpopulation 
If a state experiences a rapid growth of its own population or already has too many people, it 
may find that the territory it controls is not sufficient to support them. Political expansion may 
therefore emerge as a solution to this problem, as new territory is added to the state. This 
territory can then be made into farmland worked by people from the expanding country (or 
also by indigenous peoples or slaves taken from other places), and surplus produce from this 
farmland can be sent back to the mother country to help support the population there. It has 
been argued that this “urgent search for land and food”19 was precisely what started the 
expansion of Europe in the fifteenth century.20 
 
Security 
If a state expands into new territory because it regards control of this land as vital to its own 
security, it falls under this category. A fairly recent example concerns the Soviet Union’s 
post-World War II expansion into Eastern Europe, in which state security apparently was the 
primary aim.21 In earlier times, the Spaniards expanded up north along America’s western 
coast with the aim of safeguarding their galleons.22 Also, when Napoleon in 1798 decided to 
conquer Egypt, he did so partly in order to increase the security of Frenchmen living in the 
region. As the general stated before the conquest took place, the contemporary Egyptian 
                                                 
16 Diehl and Goertz, "Territorial Changes," 104. 
17 J. C. Hurewitz, ed. The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, Second 
ed., vol. 1: European Expansion, 1535-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press,1975), 242. 
18 Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 198-199, quote 
from 199. 
19 G. V. Scammell, The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c. 1400-1715 (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), 52. 
20 This argument is put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 
vol. 1: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Studies 
in Social Discontinuity (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 42-44. For a critique of this argument see Scammell, 
The First Imperial Age, 52-53. 
21 Diehl and Goertz, "Territorial Changes," 104. 
22 Scammell, The First Imperial Age, 67. 
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government “have engaged in open hostilities and most horrible cruelties against the French, 
whom they vex, pillage, and assassinate daily”.23 
 
Ideology 
This category has to do with non-material motives. Religion (Christianity in the case of 
Europe) would be one of many important examples. For instance, when the Europeans 
initiated the eastern crusade in the eleventh century, Christianity no doubt played an important 
role in this event taking place. The reason is that Jerusalem for a long time had been one of 
the most important Christian pilgrimage sites, and that this century also saw the surfacing of 
“a reformed papacy with ambitions to exercise universal authority over Christians wherever 
they might be found [thus including the Christian pilgrims in Jerusalem] and which was 
conscious of a universal proselytizing mission.”24 
 
 
 
But how is one to find out what motive(s) the Manchus had when expanding into Central 
Asia? To begin, it may be useful to look at how the emperor and his elites justified the 
expansion in advance of the actual event. But as has been noted, “justifications…may or may 
not be indicative of underlying motives.”25 One must therefore also look at what policies were 
undertaken immediately after the expansion was concluded or brought to a halt. To give an 
example, if a European monarch expressed strong desires for a “civilizing mission,” for 
example to Christianize the indigenous peoples in the territory being expanded into, ahead of 
the actual conquest of this territory, and this was followed by extensive preaching among and 
conversion of the native peoples after the conquest was finished, one should be able to say 
that this was a fairly strong motive for political expansion into this territory. This is 
particularly the case if there were made little or no attempts at resource extraction, 
commercial expansion or immigration of Europeans in this same period. If, however, the 
immediate post-conquest period was followed by heavy immigration of Europeans, and the 
indigenous population were not made into Christians but were enslaved and put to work in 
                                                 
23 Hurewitz, ed. The Middle East and North Africa, 115-116, quote from 115. Hurewitz cites Napoleon I, 
Correspondance de Napoléon 1er (Paris: Plon, 1858-70), 4:52-53. 
24 Phillips, The Medieval Expansion, 243. 
25 Alexander B. Murphy, "Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims," Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 80, no. 4 (December 1990): 532. 
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newly opened mines or similar ventures, a “civilizing mission” can’t have been a very strong 
motive for the conquest. Instead, the dominant motives probably were to obtain resources and 
to find means of supporting excessive people back home. Therefore, what was said in advance 
and what was done immediately afterwards seems to be important guiding points for finding 
out what the strongest motive(s) were. 
As I see it, however, at least two challenges are presented by this theoretical framework. 
First, while it may be convenient to treat the expansion of a particular state into a particular 
region as one single historical event, this expansion may be a process taking years, decades, 
or even centuries. For example, while the Russians started their Siberian invasion in 1581, it 
was not until 1649 (that is, over 65 years later) that they got to the Pacific Coast at the other 
end of the region (see Chapter 2). When it comes to such long-lasting expansions as this, it is 
not at all certain that the conquerors’ motives are the same at all times. If one thinks of 
European expansion as a whole, one can say that Christianity played a larger role in the early 
(meaning the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) and late (the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries) period than in the middle period (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), which saw 
“the almost exclusive concentration of Europeans…on economic interest and a mercantilist 
view of competition”.26 One must remember, therefore, that motives for expansion can 
change as time goes by. 
Second, even though up to this point I have been talking about the Qing Empire’s motives 
for expansion into Central Asia, it is of course a fact that this empire, like any other political 
entity, is (or was) incapable of having any motives of its own. As Pamela Kyle Crossley 
writes, “the state does not believe.”27 The individuals who constitutes the government of a 
particular state of course can have motives, but these may not all be similar to one another. 
When it comes to empires like the Qing, it is true, one may think that this is not that big of a 
problem, since empires usually have a single individual, an emperor or empress, who at least 
theoretically is located at the very top of the government. And the Qing emperors who 
combated the Junghars and annexed Xinjiang are in fact known for being powerful rulers, as 
they “made substantial personal efforts to secure intelligence, make decisions, and control the 
                                                 
26 Adam Watson, "European International Society and its Expansion," in The Expansion of International 
Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 31. 
27 Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), 225. 
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system of governance at their disposal.”28 As Jonathan D. Spence reminds us, however, “Any 
emperor of China was…merely one individual, occupying a special position within his 
society but unable to comprehend all that society’s ramifications. Also, the actions and 
thoughts ascribed to him were often those of others, of relatives, courtiers, eunuchs, 
bureaucrats.”29 It is important to remember, then, that even in an empire such as the Qing, 
government policies were shaped not just by one person but by many people, and that these 
people, in turn, were not necessarily always likeminded and therefore did not necessarily 
always have the same motives. 
 
 
1.2 Defining Central Asia 
Before I begin my narrative and start coping with the above challenges, however, I shall first 
endeavor to describe where exactly Central Asia is, in addition to outline the geographical 
characteristics of the region. This may not be as easy as it sounds, though, since nearly “every 
scholar defines the boundaries of the region differently.”30 In addition, many different 
designations are being used, making it even more confusing. Peter C. Perdue uses the name 
“Central Eurasia,” and by this means the territory extending “from the Ukrainian steppes in 
the west to the shores of the Pacific in the east, from the southern edge of the Siberian forests 
to the Tibetan plateau.”31  
Many also operate with the term “Inner Asia,” though the area attached to this name varies 
greatly. For Svat Soucek it refers to Kazakhstan, Xinjiang, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.32 For Denis Sinor “it is that part of Eurasia which, at 
any given time, lay beyond the borders of the sedentary world.”33 According to Perdue, the 
name is “conventionally defined as modern Mongolia (Inner and Outer), Manchuria, 
Xinjiang, and Tibet”.34  
                                                 
28 Willard J. Peterson, "Introduction: New Order for the Old Order," in Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 
1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 7. 
29 Jonathan D. Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," in Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. 
Peterson, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 120. 
30 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 19. 
31 Perdue, China Marches West, 19. 
32 Soucek, A History of Inner Asia. 
33 Denis Sinor, "Introduction: The Concept of Inner Asia," in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. 
Denis Sinor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16. 
34 Perdue, China Marches West, XIII. 
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The name that I use here, namely “Central Asia,” also has more than one definition. In The 
Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia, for example, we learn that Central Asia is 
the same as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan only.35 In An 
Historical Atlas of Central Asia, however, Yuri Bregel shows that Central Asia embraces not 
just these five states, but that it contains the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region as well. His 
definition of Central Asia is therefore the one that best fits my thesis. In this atlas, the areas of 
the first five states are collectively referred to as “Western Turkestan,” whereas the territory 
of present-day Xinjiang is referred to as “Eastern Turkestan.”36 Because the name Xinjiang 
(which means “New Dominion”) was not used for this territory until after the Qing had 
annexed the Junghar Khanate (see Chapter 3), and because this thesis endeavors to compare 
the Qing and the Russian empires’ Central Asian policies, I will use the name “Eastern 
Turkestan,” not Xinjiang, for the rest of this thesis.37  
 
 
 
Let us now examine Central Asia in a bit more detail. What are the essential geographical 
traits of the area? First, one must know that “Central Asia as a whole is characterized by an 
extreme continental climate, with high aridity that increases from north to south and from the 
mountains to the plains.”38 This aridity has many causes, one of them being that the 
mountains in Central Asia prevents the monsoon winds from reaching the region, another 
being that its geographical location so far away from the ocean also prevents the Atlantic 
westerlies from having much effect. Central Asia, then, receives very little rainfall, meaning 
that its natural conditions are unsuited to the “normal” way of conducting agriculture.39 
Second, the area can be “divided into three main natural regions: steppe, desert, and 
mountains.”40 Below follows a brief description of each:  
                                                 
35 Rafis Abazov, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008). 
36 Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, vol. 9, Handbook of Oriental Studies: Section Eight: 
Central Asia (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
37 This is not an unproblematic choice, however. Since the name “Turkestan” is associated with modern 
Uyghur separatists and since it was also used by the two republics briefly existing in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 
40s it is, therefore, a term full of political controversy. As James A. Millward states, it “only appears in China if 
carefully quarantined in quotation marks and attributed to Western colonialists or contemporary terrorists.” 
Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, IX-X, quote from X. As I have explained above, however, I have only academic 
reasons for adopting this term here, not a political agenda of any kind. 
38 Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2. 
39 S. A. M. Adshead, Central Asia in World History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 7, 14-15. 
40 Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2. 
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Mountains 
The mountains, we have already seen, are responsible for keeping the monsoons out of 
Central Asia. Furthermore, they also mark borders, both within the Central Asian region and 
between Central Asia and the rest of the world. The southern border of Central Asia, for 
example, is drawn by the Kopet-Dagh, Hindukush, and Kunlun mountains (this latter 
mountain range splits Eastern Turkestan and the Tibetan plateau), and the region’s 
northeastern border is represented by the Altay Mountains (which divides Eastern Turkestan 
and Mongolia). The Tien-Shan Mountains separates the steppe and desert regions of Eastern 
Turkestan, whereas the Pamir-Alay Mountains splits Eastern Turkestan and Western 
Turkestan (see Map 2).41 
 
Steppe 
After the mountains there are the steppes. This region of Central Asia, which is found south of 
the Siberian woodland and “north of the Aral Sea, the Sïr-Darya river, and the Tien-Shan 
mountains, is a part of the great steppe belt stretching across the Eurasian continent from 
Manchuria in the east to Hungary in the west.”42 The Central Asian steppes can be broken up 
into three parts, namely the Dasht-i Qïpchaq (“the Steppe of the Qïpchaqs”) and Semirech’e 
(“Seven rivers”) in Western Turkestan, and Jungharia in Eastern Turkestan.43 
As already mentioned, the lack of rain in Central Asia means that standard agriculture has 
been difficult to practice in this part of the world, and therefore also that its inhabitants have 
had to find other ways of getting by. As for the steppe region, this “other way” has been 
nomadic pastoralism. The pastoral nomads maintained herds of animals (camels, cattle, goats, 
horses, sheep, and/or yaks), and from these animals they obtained all the necessities of daily 
life. The nomads’ herds required grass, however, and since they did not grow any grass 
themselves, they had to move their animals from place to place in the steppes looking for 
pastureland that they could feed on. The pastoral nomads, therefore, depended on favorable 
meteorological conditions, since drought or cold weather could incapacitate the pasturelands 
of the region, thereby leading to large numbers of animals starving to death.44 
                                                 
41 Bregel, An Historical Atlas, VII, 2; Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 5. 
42 Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2. 
43 Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2. 
44 Adshead, Central Asia, 15-16; Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2. 
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The pastoral nomads, then, fought “a constant battle against a harsh environment and 
meteorological uncertainty”.45 Despite these apparent drawbacks, however, they had an 
advantage in that they were both militarily powerful and highly mobile. These two assets 
enabled them to dominate the political and military landscape of Central Asia for several 
hundred years.46 It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, that when the Qing and Russian 
empires encroached on Central Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was the 
Central Asian nomads who became their main antagonists. The Qing Empire faced off with 
the Junghar nomads, who occupied (and also named) the Jungharia region.47 The Russian 
Empire confronted the Qazaq nomads, who were in the Dasht-i Qïpchaq and Semirech’e 
regions48 (these two confrontations will be explored further in Chapter 3). 
 
Desert 
“South of the steppe belt lies the desert zone, which occupies the largest part of Central Asia 
and encompasses three major deserts, the Qara-qum, Qïzïl-qum, and Taqla-Makan,”49 the last 
of which is in Eastern Turkestan. The Taqla-Makan Desert and the lands contiguous to it are 
often called the Tarim Basin or Altïshar. To the east of Altïshar (meaning east of the 
Baghrash Lake and the Quruq Mountains) is found the Turfan Depression, which consists of 
the Turfan oasis and its hinterlands (including the Hami oasis). In Western Turkestan, the 
major desert area is that flanked by the Amu-Darya and Sïr-Darya rivers, a region usually 
known as Mavarannahr or Transoxiana (“That which is beyond the [Amu or Oxus] River”).50 
Similar to the steppe region, the desert region is also very much lacking in rainfall (the 
desert to an even larger degree than the steppe). In order to combat this dryness, however, the 
desert inhabitants used a different method than the steppe inhabitants; they practiced oasis 
agriculture, not nomadic pastoralism. By tapping water from rivers, constructing wells, and 
making use of kariz (aqueducts leading to subterranean water basins) and springs, the oasis 
agriculturalists could grow grain, cotton, melons, grapes, and other agricultural commodities, 
which in turn could support the clergy, craftsmen, officials, and traders also living in the 
oasis. Oasis agriculture made the desert region the economical powerhouse of Central Asia, 
                                                 
45 Adshead, Central Asia, 16. 
46 Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2. 
47 Perdue, China Marches West, 33. 
48 Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, 195. 
49 Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2. 
50 Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2; Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 5-6; Millward and Perdue, "Political and 
Cultural History," 29-30. 
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but because it was the nomads who were (often) the strongest military power, and because 
these nomads also were in need of the products that the oasis produced, it was common for 
Mavarannahr, the Tarim Basin, and the Turfan Depression to be controlled by the nomads in 
Semirech’e and Jungharia.51 The Junghars, for example, took charge of the Tarim Basin and 
the Turfan Depression in 1678-80, and this enabled them to enrich themselves on the 
resources of these two regions (see Chapter 3). 
 
 
1.3 Sources 
I have now defined the location and explored the geography of Central Asia, as well as 
established the theoretical framework that will be used in this thesis. But what kind of sources 
will it be based on? 
It must unfortunately be admitted that I only draw on secondary literature here. Unlike 
other works of history, therefore, which usually employ archival sources and/or primary 
sources in published form, this thesis will only make use of articles and books written by 
other scholars. Why is this the case? The reason has to do with language skills. Were I to base 
this thesis on the study of primary sources, it would probably have required me to examine 
hundreds (if not thousands) of pages of Chinese, Manchu, and Russian documents, and 
perhaps also documents written in other languages. Having only a basic knowledge of 
Chinese, and no skills whatsoever in the rest of these languages, this would have been an 
impossible task to undertake. 
Although I only use secondary literature, however, I still think that this thesis is a valid 
scholarly work. As Finn Fuglestad has stated, “To write from one [author only] is 
plagiarizing, to write from multiple [authors] is to conduct research.”52 Furthermore, although 
the two principal “duals” in this story (the Qing Empire versus Eastern Turkestan and the 
Russian Empire versus Western Turkestan) have both already been extensively explored, I 
have found no work that compares them directly as I have here. 
When it comes to the secondary literature itself, it is not possible to review all of it in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, I will quickly go through the most central works. The single most 
important book used in my study is the already cited China Marches West: The Qing 
                                                 
51 Adshead, Central Asia, 20-22; Bregel, An Historical Atlas, 2; Millward and Perdue, "Political and Cultural 
History," 30-33. 
52 Finn Fuglestad, Fra svartedauden til Wienerkongressen: Den vesterlandske kulturkretsens historie 1347-
1815 i et globalt-sammenliknende perspektiv, Second ed. (Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 2004), 5. 
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Conquest of Central Eurasia written by Peter C. Perdue. It has been significant both as a 
reference and as an inspirational source (it was from here, for example, that I got the idea of 
comparing the Qing Empire with Russia). The works of the Xinjiang-specialist James A. 
Millward have also been invaluable, and particularly Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, 
and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 and Eurasian Crossroads: A History of 
Xinjiang. Pamela Kyle Crossley, too, has been frequently referred to, and then it has usually 
been from her A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology or her 
“Making Mongols,” which is a chapter found in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, 
and Frontier in Early Modern China. One must also not forget The Cambridge History of 
China, and especially Part One: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800 (volume 9 in the series). When 
discussing the Russian Empire and the Qazaqs I have most often used The Kazakhs, written 
by Martha Brill Olcott and Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 
1500-1800, written by Michael Khodarkovsky. 
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2 Approaching Central Asia: The 
Qing, Russia, the Ming, and Siberia 
(1581-1689) 
As explained in Chapter 1, the main aim of this thesis is to explore what motives were behind 
the Qing and Russian engagements with Central Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Before I proceed to this task, however, it is necessary to know the background of 
the two states in question. In this chapter I examine how the Qing and Russian empires came 
to be, and also trace the Qing expansion into China53 and Taiwan (1644-83), in addition to the 
Russian expansion into Siberia54 (1581-1689). Although neither China nor Siberia is in 
Central Asia, I believe that the Qing and Russian expansions into these two regions were 
necessary preconditions for the later confrontations with Central Asia, and that they therefore 
are highly relevant and need to be included in this thesis. Why did the Manchus expand into 
China? Did they seek resources, security, a commercial market, agricultural lands, or were 
there perhaps an ideological reason behind it? And what were the Russians looking for in 
Siberia?    
At the end of this chapter I explore what happened when the Qing and Russian states 
collided on the Amur River in the latter half of the seventeenth century (1643-1689). As we 
shall see, the end result of this encounter was the Treaty of Nerchinsk, a Qing-Russian border 
treaty that was negotiated in 1689 at the Russian fort bearing the same name, and that was 
also the prelude to the first battle between the Qing and the Central Asian Junghars. The story 
of the Qing encounter with the Junghars, and also the Russian encounter with the Qazaqs, is 
then explored in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
53 I define China as the lands of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). Under the succeeding Qing dynasty it was 
“reconfigured as eighteen provinces”, and became “the inner territory (the [neidi]), known as ‘China proper’ 
since the nineteenth century.” Peterson, "Introduction," 7. 
54 I follow James Forsyth and define Siberia as the territory that  “stretches for some 2,800 miles from the 
Urals to the shores of the Pacific Ocean…while in its most northerly, arctic latitudes, it extends for a further 950 
miles eastward to the tip of Chuckchi-land…where the 50-mile-wide Bering Strait separates Asia from Alaska.” 
James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony, 1581-1990 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6-7. The Arctic Ocean forms the northern border, whereas “nearly all of 
Siberia lies north of the fiftieth parallel of latitude,” which therefore serves as an approximate southern border 
marker. Forsyth, The Peoples of Siberia, 7. 
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2.1 The Founding of the Qing Empire 
The Qing Empire was established in 1636 by a man named Hong Taiji. It was a fusion of two 
political entities that existed in the early seventeenth century. The first and most important of 
these was the Latter Jin Khanate in the Northeast or Manchuria,55 created by Hong Taiji’s 
father Nurhaci (1559-1626) in 1616. Nurhaci began the construction of his state in 1583, 
when he initiated the military campaigns that eventually would incorporate the Manchu tribes 
(or Jurchen tribes before 1635)56 in Manchuria into a single state structure. Many Mongols 
and Chinese were also brought in. In order to accomplish this feat Nurhaci founded the 
banners, an organization designed to redirect the tribal loyalties of the Manchus towards a 
single banner commander, which in turn served under Nurhaci. In 1615 the Eight Banners 
were founded, which “laid the basis for the multiethnic coalition that Nurhaci proclaimed as 
the Latter Jin empire in 1616.”57 In 1626 Nurhaci died, and his son Hong Taiji took over as 
Jin khan the following year. But Nurhaci didn’t plan for Hong Taiji to rule all by himself. He 
supported a collective ruling system, and so Hong Taiji was joined by powerful Manchu 
nobles who were to govern the Jin state together with him.58 
The second predecessor state of the Qing was the Mongolian Chahar Federation. This 
federation was after 1617 Nurhaci’s and Hong Taiji’s most powerful regional rival. Its leader 
in the seventeenth century was Ligdan Khan, who based his legitimacy on descent from 
Chinggis Khan in addition to patronage of Tibetan Buddhism.59 Decent from Chinggis had 
ever since the last years of the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) been an important part of the 
legitimacy of rulership in Mongolia, and had in the sixteenth century been mixed in with 
Tibetan Buddhism.60 
For Hong Taiji to become supreme autocrat of Manchuria, therefore, he would have to 
shake off the Manchu nobles’ power at home, in addition to destroy the Chahars. From when 
he became Jin khan in 1627 until 1636 he managed to accomplish both of these objectives. In 
                                                 
55 Manchuria is the region located to the north of the Great Wall, to the east of the Mongolian steppes, to the 
south of the Amur River, and to the west of Korea, the Sea of Japan, and the Tatar Strait. It is “a place where 
forest, steppe, and agricultural lands overlap.” Gertraude Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," in Part One: 
The Ch'ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9-10, quote from 9. 
56 See Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 27. 
57 Perdue, China Marches West, 110-111, quote from 110. 
58 Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 51-52. 
59 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 210-212. 
60 Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Making Mongols," in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in 
Early Modern China ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), 62-63. 
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order to take care of the nobles, one of the things Hong Taiji did was to import Ming-dynasty 
government institutions and laws into the Jin Khanate. This enabled him to build up a 
bureaucracy that was subservient only to him, and which in turn was used to assert his 
domination over the nobility.61 Then, in 1633 the Chahar federation was destroyed by Hong 
Taiji’s army, initiating “the remarkable process that between 1634 and 1636 ended both the 
Northern Yuan [the Chahar federation] and the Later Jin khanates, initiated the Qing empire 
that amalgamated both…[and] installed [Hong] Taiji himself as an emperor”.62 
 
  
2.2 China and Taiwan is Taken (1644-83) 
8 years after Hong Taiji became Qing emperor, the first great period of Qing expansion 
commenced. In 1644 the Qing armies expanded south into China through the Great Wall. The 
Ming was in chaos, and Beijing had fallen to the rebel Li Zicheng. The Ming general Wu 
Sangui decided that it was best to find outside allies to help him fight Li, and so he struck a 
deal with the Qing. The Manchus were allowed entrance into China, after which they helped 
Wu defeat Li’s army. The Manchus then moved into Beijing and put Hong Taiji’s son Fulin 
on the throne there. Fulin is perhaps better known as the Shunzhi emperor (ruled 1643-61), 
and he succeeded his father as Qing monarch when the latter died suddenly in 1643. 
Following the Beijing takeover, the northern provinces were conquered by 1645. The 
southern areas proved more difficult to incorporate. Ming loyalists refused to give up their 
cause, and they were not thrown out of southern China until 1659. But after throwing out the 
Ming loyalists, the Qing government let south China fall under the control of three powerful 
generals, namely Wu Sangui (the same individual that sought Qing help against Li Zicheng), 
Geng Jingzhong and Shang Kexi. These generals began consolidating their own personal 
power until they eventually represented a fundamental challenge to the Qing state in the 
north. In 1674 Wu Sangui rebelled against the Qing, and he was later followed by Geng 
Jingzhong and Shang Zhixin (the son of Shang Kexi). Only after 7 years of brutal warfare (the 
Three Feudatories War, lasting from 1674 to 1681) were these territories brought under 
                                                 
61 Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 60-61. 
62 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 212-213, 317, quote from 212-213. 
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Beijing’s firm control. The southern expansion was brought to a close with the conquest of 
Taiwan in 1683.63 
 
 
2.3 Motives for Expansion into China and Taiwan 
What motivated this Qing expansion? In fact, both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji had long planned 
this conquest. Their motives were largely ideological, although concern with overpopulation 
in Manchuria was also present and, as we shall see, was an additional cause for expansion.  
Let us first look at the ideological motives. One of the more detailed studies of the Qing 
conquest of China is Frederick Wakeman Jr.’s The Great Enterprise: The Manchu 
Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China. The main title of the book 
(“The Great Enterprise”) refers to “a Confucian dynasty’s effort to gain and hold the Mandate 
of Heaven by ruling the ‘under-Heaven’ (tianxia) of China”.64 The “Mandate of Heaven” is 
an ancient ruling ideology in China, going as far back as the Zhou dynasty (1045/40-256 
B.C.). According to this ideological theory, a Chinese emperor’s power as absolute sovereign 
was always dependent on heaven’s backing. Should he rule tyrannically or behave badly, 
heaven would cease supporting him and give the Mandate to someone else, who thereafter 
had the opportunity to overthrow the present ruler.65 
In the early seventeenth century Nurhaci started uttering the belief that he was going to 
take over the Mandate from the Ming. In 1612, 1614, 1615, and 1618 strange lights (which 
probably were northern lights)66 showed in the skies over Manchuria. Nurhaci said this meant 
that the Ming’s Mandate was moving in his direction. In 1616 Nurhaci promulgated a new 
khanate called Jin and started referring to himself as “Heavenly Mandated Khan of the Jin 
Country.”67 The name “Jin” referred back to the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1121-1234), an empire 
that 400 years earlier had ruled the northern part of China, Manchuria, Siberia, as well some 
Mongolian territories. Pamela Kyle Crossley, however, argues that Nurhaci in fact did not 
                                                 
63 For a more detailed narrative of these events, consult Jerry Dennerline, "The Shun-chih Reign," in Part 
One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 74-89, 92-101, 116-118; Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," 136-147. 
64 Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in 
Seventeenth-Century China, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 21n53. 
65 Irene Bloom, David S. Nivison, and Burton Watson, "Classical Sources of Chinese Tradition," in Sources 
of Chinese Tradition, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, vol. 1: From Earliest Times to 1600, 
Introduction to Asian Civilizations (New York: Colombia University Press, 1999), 27-28. 
66 Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 38n78. 
67 Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 37-38. 
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have a plan to attack the Ming in Beijing, but only to drive them out of Manchuria. As she 
states, “There is no contemporary evidence…to suggest that [Nurhaci] ever resolved to 
succeed the Ming in their own realm. The change of regime…was to occur in the Northeast, 
where Ming authority would give way to [Nurhaci’s] control.”68 I believe, however, that 
Nurhaci in fact wanted to conquer China as well (though perhaps mainly the northern part, 
since this was what the previous Jin had controlled). In the early 1620s, for example, Nurhaci 
encountered a group of Chinese while he was out campaigning with his army. At the sight of 
Nurhaci’s forces, the Chinese fled, which in turn led Nurhaci to declare to them: “Come out 
of hiding and down from the mountains because even if you go inside the [Shanhai] Pass [i.e. 
into Ming territories]…my great army will enter the Pass in 1623-4.”69 Also, in the process of 
expanding his state, Nurhaci frequently relocated his capital, and this was not always popular 
among his belies (or princes). Nurhaci, however, explained to them the necessity of looking 
“at the larger picture of establishing the great enterprise [i.e. establish rule in China].”70 In 
spite of Crossley’s argument, then, I believe that Nurhaci in fact wanted to take (north) China 
and rid it of the Ming dynasty. 
Nurhaci’s son and successor Hong Taiji picked up the thread where his father had left off. 
For example, “During the Jin raid upon [Beijing] in the summer of 1629…he traveled out to 
Fangshan and made sacrifice at the tombs of the Jin emperors Agūda [the original Jin’s 
‘founding father’] and Shizong.”71 Also, Hong Taiji’s motives were further clarified in 1636 
when he created the Qing Empire. It has been argued that this particular name (Qing) was 
chosen because it had parallels to Ming. Additionally, the reign name that Hong Taiji adopted 
at this time (“Chongde”) was quite close to that of the contemporary Ming emperor 
(“Chongzhen”).72 Furthermore, “By 1636 the [Qing] government [also] had counterpart 
versions of most of the Ming governmental functions in place”.73 Chinese officials also 
increased in status, as Hong Taiji promoted many of them to influential positions in his 
government. These bureaucrats supported Hong Taiji’s quest for personal power and 
conquest. Sensing that the power of the Ming dynasty was weak, one of these officials 
memorialized to Hong Taiji: “This is the opportunity to enter…If the khan does not take the 
                                                 
68 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 144-145, quote from 144. 
69 Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 37. Roth Li cites Jiu Manzhou dang (Taipei, 1969), 2:1089; Kanda 
Nobuo et al., Mambun Rōtō (Tokyo, 1955-63), 2:581-582. The Shanhai Pass had since 1389 been “the main 
route between China and Manchuria”. Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 11. 
70 Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 38-39, quote from 39. Roth Li cites Da Qing Taizu Gao huangdi 
shilu, rpt. as vol. 6 of Qing shi ziliao, Kai guo shi liao (2) (Taipei, 1969), Chapter 8, 17a-b. 
71 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 145-146. 
72 Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 63, 63n161. 
73 Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 61. 
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opportunity at once, there is no telling whether such a large country will continue to be 
weak.”74 As Gertraude Roth Li notes, “Such advice demonstrated their support for the khan’s 
plan to conquer Ming.”75 In sum, there is much evidence to support the argument that both 
Nurhaci and Hong Taiji had long-lasting ideological motives for expansion into China. 
But what happened after the conquest? Does the Manchus’ post-conquest rule fit the 
argument that they were motivated by obtaining the Mandate of Heaven? It is important to 
know that although Nurhaci and Hong Taiji were responsible for the ideological formulations 
discussed above, neither of them ever ruled from Beijing. The post-conquest government’s 
most powerful figure was Dorgon, who was regent for the Shunzhi emperor until his death in 
1650. How did Dorgon and his government rule China? Was it different from the Ming? 
Although it is true that the Qing government certainly wasn’t a Ming copy,76 nevertheless 
increasing Chinese influence was the norm under Dorgon. He instituted the practice of having 
both Chinese and Manchus serving together in high government positions, and the Manchus 
were thrown out of the Six Boards. In other words, the “Chinese turn” that gained momentum 
under Hong Taiji continued with Dorgon. The post-Dorgon period saw two years of factional 
struggle until the Shunzhi emperor took charge of the state in 1653. Fulin too, increased the 
power of the Chinese at the expense of the Manchus, so much so that when he died in 1661 a 
group of Manchu nobles (Ebilun, Oboi, Soni, and Suksaha) with support from the Empress 
Dowager took over and started reversing this trend. Ming government institutions lost power 
and Chinese officials suffered persecutions.77 But with the ascension of Fulin’s son Xuanye 
(the Kangxi emperor) in 1669, the Chinese course was again resumed. In his “Sacred Edict” 
(published in 1670) and subsequent promulgations, Kangxi spoke directly to the Han Chinese 
and justified his rule in the Confucian language they were familiar with.78 The climax of 
Kangxi’s efforts to integrate the Han Chinese civilian elite came in 1679 with the grand 
Boxue Hongru examination, in which “the key inducement…was an opportunity for 
successful candidates to work on the compilation of the official history of the Ming.”79 
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I’ve argued above that the Manchus’ motives for expansion into China was strongly 
ideological, that is, they believed that the Mandate of Heaven was about to be transferred to 
them. The expressions and actions of Nurhaci and Hong Taiji support this view, as does the 
post-conquest Qing governance of China proper. But were there other motives? Did the 
Manchus have other aims by expanding their state? 
Overpopulation was also an important motive for expansion. The Manchu rulers realized 
from an early stage that Manchuria had limited natural resources. As more and more people 
(either voluntarily or involuntarily) came under Manchu control, the problem of feeding these 
people became an important topic of concern. It emerged as early as 1615, the same year as 
the formation of the Eight Banners, and lasted until 1644, when the Manchus expanded into 
north China and took Beijing. Although the Manchus previously had been able to survive on 
Manchuria’s own resources, the increasing number of Chinese and Mongol subordinates 
following Nurhaci’s successes made these resources inadequate. In 1615 Nurhaci realized that 
his grain supplies were insufficient for the population currently under his control.80 As he said 
to his Manchu nobles that year: “Now we have captured so many Chinese and animals, how 
shall we feed them? Even our own people will die. Now during this breathing spell let us first 
take care of our people and secure all places, erect gates, till the fields, and fill the 
granaries.”81 But even after maximizing the agricultural output of his state, and despite 
getting additional grain supplies from raiding Korea and Liaodong (the area north of China 
and northwest of Korea),82 the amount of food continued to be insufficient. In 1619 Nurhaci 
said to his Mongolian subjects that if they were to join him on campaign, they had to support 
themselves and also not rob the Jin population. It became increasingly clear that the Manchus 
had to take control over additional agricultural lands in order to find a more permanent 
solution to their food problems, and to this end Nurhaci in 1619 opted for expanding into 
Liaodong.83 But Liaodong had a Chinese population of 1 million people, so that even though 
the Manchus after the conquest increased the total amount of farmland under their control 
their number of subjects increased as well.84  
Subsequent unrest and revolts in Manchuria showed that the Manchus had not solved their 
logistical problems. Because the Manchus repeatedly found themselves without anything to 
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eat, they attempted to get food from the Chinese agriculturalists. The Chinese resisted by 
trying to hide their grain. After suffering years of repression by Manchu superiors, a Chinese 
rebellion commenced in 1623 and again in 1625. Manchus were killed, buildings were ignited 
and grain was stolen from the granaries. Though order was restored without much difficulty, 
it was clear that the Manchus still had huge problems with their food supply.85 
The situation was no better under Hong Taiji. Right after becoming Jin khan he sent a 
letter to the Korean king expressing his concerns: “If we alone had to live on the grain 
produced in our country…there would be enough. But you must have heard that the Mongol 
khan (Ligdan) is bad and that the Mongols have been coming over to us in an endless stream. 
These people need to be fed, yet there is not enough grain.”86 The price of grain this year 
(1627) increased to eight times that of 1623, apparently leading to robberies and instances of 
cannibalism.87 The Manchus therefore pressed the Koreans, their neighbors in the southeast, 
to give them grain on an annual basis as tribute, or else they would invade the capital. This 
arrangement was clarified further in the Manchu-Korean treaty of 1637. But there were limits 
as to how much grain even Korea could provide. They had been invaded by Japan in 1592 and 
experienced domestic uprisings by the military in 1624. Korea therefore provided less grain 
than what was hoped for. In the year 1640, for example, Hong Taiji received only one tenth of 
what the Manchu-Korean treaty stipulated.88 Not surprisingly, expansion southward into 
Ming territory was seen as a way of solving the problem. A Chinese official memorialized: 
“As soon as the [Shanhai] Pass in open, the eight cities inside China will inevitably be ours. 
Once the eight cities are taken, the great empire [the Ming] will follow, and how would we 
then have to worry again about our people going hungry?”89 
Only in 1644 then, did the Manchus finally find a solution to their food supply problems. 
The majority of the Manchurian population was simply relocated south from Manchuria into 
China,90 leaving Manchuria with very little people left. Only with the later Russian incursions 
into the northeast would the Qing rulers again direct their full attention towards this 
territory.91 Also, one of the first things that the Manchus did after taking Beijing was to seize 
a large amount of farmland in northern China. These lands were previously owned by the 
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Ming ruling house or by private individuals. Now they were to support the Banners and 
various high ranking Manchus.92 It would take many decades before food problems or 
overpopulation was voiced as major concerns again. 
 
 
 
In the preceding pages I’ve tried to show that ideological motives and a desire to find food for 
the ever increasing population in Manchuria should be highly emphasized when explaining 
the Qing expansion into China and Taiwan. From the early 1600s on, the upcoming Manchu 
leader Nurhaci expressed ambitions to overtake the Mandate of Heaven from the Ming 
dynasty. His son Hong Taiji followed in his footsteps and took it a step further by building a 
Ming-like government. After the Manchu conquest, the Qing rulers by and large tried to be 
accepted as heavenly mandated sovereigns by their new Chinese subjects. 
But as Perdue rightly emphasizes, “From…[1615] until the conquest of Beijing, the urgent 
need for grain supplies became a major factor in the expansion of the state.”93 Nurhaci, Hong 
Taiji, and some of their government officials expressed their concerns about this, and 
rebellions in Manchuria also testify to this subsistence crisis. After taking China most of the 
Manchurian population was shipped south, and farmlands were appropriated to make sure that 
the Manchus had a solid base of support. 
 
 
2.4 The Founding of the Russian Empire 
The Russian Empire (or Muscovy before the eighteenth century)94 started its ascension to 
power in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when Mongol control of Russia began to 
deteriorate. The Mongols, it is well known, stormed out of the Mongolian steppes in the 
beginning of the thirteenth century and managed to subjugate much of Eurasia. One of many 
states that fell before them was the Russian Kievan Rus (conquered in 1237-41). The huge 
Mongol Empire eventually split in four, and each branch was ruled by a descendant of their 
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first great leader, the famous Chinggis Khan (c.1162-1227). Among these successor polities 
were the Yuan dynasty in China, established by Chinggis’ grandson Khubilai, and the Golden 
Horde in Russia, established by Chinggis’ grandson Batu.95 
Although the Golden Horde controlled Russia for about two centuries, their power 
weakened as time went by, and especially from the end of the fourteenth century. The main 
reason for the Golden Horde’s decline was domestic fragmentation. Other states began to rise 
in the Horde’s realm, and Muscovy was one of these states. In 1380 the Muscovite prince 
Dmitri Donskoi managed to defeat the Mongol Mamay’s forces. Although formal 
independence from the Golden Horde was not yet achieved (it would have to wait until the 
next century), Muscovy had begun its rise to power.96 
Under Ivan III (the Great, ruled 1462-1505) and Vasilii III (ruled 1505-33) Muscovy 
annexed the other political entities in Russia (Novgorod, Pskov, Riazan, Rostov, Tver’, 
Viatka, and Yaroslavl), and Ivan III has by historians in Russia been titled “the gatherer of the 
Russian lands.”97 Also, in 1481 Ivan terminated the tribute payments to the Golden Horde. 
The Horde later disintegrated, and other political groupings sprung up in its stead. These were 
the khanates of Astrakhan’, the Crimea, and Kazan’, in addition to the Noghays. Under Ivan 
IV (the Terrible, ruled 1533-84) Kazan’ and Astrakhan’ were incorporated into Muscovy.98 
As Walter G. Moss notes, these triumphs, occurring in 1552 and 1556 respectively, “paved 
the way for further eastward expansion [into Siberia] and the development of an increasingly 
multinational, multicultured empire.”99 
 
   
2.5 Russia Conquers Siberia (1581-1689) 
Ivan the Terrible’s victory over Kazan’ in 1552 made the mineral-rich land of Perm available 
to Russian emigrants. A merchant called Gregory Stroganov was in 1558 allowed by Ivan to 
establish a tax- and customs-free enterprise here. The Sibir’ Khanate, a political entity located 
just east of the Urals with its center in the vicinity of today’s Tobol’sk, believed this to be 
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their land, however. As a consequence it was repeatedly raided by the Sibir’ khan Kuchum’s 
troops.100 This led Gregory’s nephew to recruit a Cossack named Ermak Timofeevich to serve 
as protector for his properties. This was an individual previously leading “a freebooting 
pirate’s life plundering caravans and Tsarist officials along the Don and Volga rivers.”101 
Ermak and his army headed for Siberia in 1581, and they attacked and conquered the Sibir’ 
capital in 1582. Kuchum managed to escape, however, but he was never able to take back 
what he had lost. Although Ermak and the major share of his troops perished in 1585, 
Kuchum himself got killed in 1598.102 
The Sibir’ Khanate was the last major polity to stand in the way of the Russians in Siberia. 
After the death of Ermak in 1585, the Russian government began dispatching voevody 
(governors) and Russian troops into Kuchum’s former territories. These voevody and their 
troops then started constructing Russian fortresses, helping to consolidate their position in this 
new region. Tiumen’, the first of these forts, was established in 1586, then followed Tobol’sk 
in 1587 and Tara in 1594. Further east, Narym was erected in 1596, Eniseisk was built in 
1619 and Yakutsk was constructed in 1632. In 1649 the Russians stood on the shores of the 
Pacific Ocean.103 The Russian’s eastward march was helped forward by Siberia’s many rivers 
and flat landscape, by smallpox and other diseases killing off a large part of the native 
population,104 and by the absence of a major foreign competitor. The only power denying the 
Russians full access to Siberia was actually the Qing, when the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk 
resulted in Russia acknowledging Qing control of the area south from the Stanovoi Mountains 
down to the Amur River.105 The process leading up to the materialization of this treaty will be 
discussed more fully in a later section of this chapter. 
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2.6 Siberia and Russian Goals 
What motivated this extraordinary expansion by the Russians? As we shall see, resources 
(furs and to a lesser extent minerals) were the almost exclusive motive for the Russians in this 
case. Other objectives played a very small role. This was therefore a very different expansion 
from the Qing conquest of China and Taiwan in which, as already discussed, ideology and 
overpopulation were the central factors. 
The Sibir’ khan Kuchum and his predecessor Ediger Taibugid both strove to be on good 
terms with Muscovy. Ediger made tribute payments to Ivan the Terrible, but this changed 
when Kuchum took over in 1563. His refusal to pay tribute did not mean open hostility to 
Muscovy, however, as he still strove to be on good terms with his western neighbor.106 
Conflict between Muscovy and Sibir’ became serious only after Gregory Stroganov and other 
Russians began settling in Perm. Ivan the Terrible, which was the one who gave Gregory 
permission to move here, made it clear that his mission was to “fell trees and clear farming 
land, bring in peasants, and extract any mineral ‘salts’ which were found.”107 Minerals 
induced Gregory Stroganov to erect a Russian settlement in Sibir’ territory, and the Russian 
presence was what triggered Kuchum’s raids, which in turn led to Ermak’s conquest of Sibir’ 
in 1582.108 Security being the immediate aim behind the destruction of Sibir’, it was 
nevertheless the hunt for minerals that started the Russian Siberian saga. 
What pulled the Russians all the way to the Pacific coast, however, were not minerals but 
furs (or “soft gold”). The Russians had for a long time exported furs to Europe, the Ottoman 
Empire (before 1453 the Byzantine Empire) and Persia (after taking Kazan’ and Astrakhan’) 
in exchange for foreign products such as weapons, clothing, food, and other items.109 These 
furs came from the many types of animals residing in Russia’s northern forests and in 
Siberia.110 Muscovy had made attempts at getting furs from Siberia even before the 
destruction of Sibir’, by passing the Ural Mountains using a northeastern route. After Sibir’ 
was taken, however, the Russians could now pursue “soft gold” directly from Siberia.111 The 
native peoples residing here were not able to stop the Russian onslaught, though resistance 
nevertheless was substantial (see note 52).What happened was that “the natives were coerced 
into submission and then directly exploited as producers of wealth. Wherever the Muscovites 
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extended their territory in northern Eurasia they used armed force to exact regular tribute – 
yasak – from the natives, and this was the principal means of obtaining sable and other furs 
for the treasury.”112 At the beginning of the seventeenth century, every native adult male had 
to pay 22 sable furs annually to the Russians. Half a century later the annual quota was 
reduced to 5, since there were so few of these animals left.113 The Russian Siberian expansion 
halted only when they found out at there were no furs (or animals with furs) in the area being 
expanded into. Such was the case with the territory of the Chukchis in the northeastern branch 
of Siberia where, although these people were determined resisters to the Russian expansion in 
the beginning of the eighteenth century, the absence of sables in their lands probably was the 
chief reason for them not suffering a large Russian offensive until later in the eighteenth 
century. The same was true of the steppes south of western Siberia, in which the Russian 
advance also stopped because there were no furs to be found here.114 
But was resources the only thing that the Russians sought? Unlike the Qing, at least, 
ideology and overpopulation was not central motives. Although there were Orthodox clergy 
in Russia which wanted to make converts out of the Siberian natives, since this also meant 
that they couldn’t pay yasak, it was not favored by the government.115 Also, though there 
certainly were peasants who moved into Siberia after it was “laid open” by Ermak, it was not 
on a very large scale. In 1678 only 1,32% of all Russian peasants lived in Siberia, and this had 
increased to only 3,04%  in the beginning of the eighteenth century.116 The Russian 
population (at least in and around Moscow) was actually declining at the very same time that 
the Siberian expansion began,117 so it clearly wasn’t a food hunt that the Russians were 
pursuing. The Russian peasants that moved into Siberia were to supply food for the local 
Russian establishment, not to send its surplus back westward to Moscow. But even making 
new farmland became secondary if it was pursued at the expense of yasak. In Yakutsk, a 
group of Siberian natives complained to Moscow of encroaching Russian peasants. The 
Muscovite authorities ordered that these peasants be stopped since the natives said they 
otherwise would be “unable to catch sufficient fur-bearing animals to pay their tribute 
(yasak).”118 It was resources, therefore, that made the Russians expand into Siberia. 
                                                 
112 Forsyth, The Peoples of Siberia, 41. 
113 Moss, A History of Russia, 182. 
114 Forsyth, The Peoples of Siberia, 37, 76, 81, 83. 
115 Moss, A History of Russia, 185. 
116 Moon, "Peasant Migration," 864. 
117 Peter C. Perdue, "Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and 
Mongolia," Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 769. 
118 Moon, "Peasant Migration," 877, 883, quote from 883. 
27 
 
2.7 The Clash in Northern Manchuria (1643-1689) 
I have discussed the Qing expansion into China and Taiwan and the Russian expansion into 
Siberia. In the midst of these conquests, however, the two empires eventually collided in the 
Amur region in northern Manchuria. As discussed above, the Russians in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries wanted furs and expanded into Siberia with this goal in mind. As a part 
of this process they entered the Amur region in 1643. The problem was that this territory was 
a (peripheral) part of the Qing Empire. After some 50 years of Qing-Russian clashes the two 
empires managed to agree on an inter-imperial border. The agreement was reached at the 
Russian fort of Nerchinsk in the summer of 1689. 
Although certainly a part of the Qing Empire when the Russians entered in 1643, the Amur 
region was not the core of the pre-1644 Qing state. It was only under Hong Taiji that this 
territory was brought into the Qing realm.119 But in 1644 the Qing expanded into China, and 
most of the Qing population and army moved out of Manchuria. It was precisely at this time 
that the Russians moved in. 
Why did the Russians enter the Amur? Although furs were the overarching goal for the 
Russian expansion into Siberia, the Amur region was also seen as a source of food for the 
already established Siberian garrisons. Because the forests in Siberia couldn’t produce enough 
food to fully support them, the Russian garrisons were unable to persist without additional 
food shipments sent from European Russia.120 This was especially the case with the garrisons 
located in central and eastern Siberia. Although a sizable peasant community grew up in 
western Siberia, further eastward the climate became more hostile (most areas were frozen all 
year round) so that practicing agriculture became less feasible. Central and eastern Siberia 
was of course also father away from European Russia, so that when at the end of the 1630s 
news spread of the favorable agricultural conditions prevailing in the Amur region to the 
south, this “could not but act as a magnet on the Russians.”121 
The Russian expedition that was the first to enter the Amur region set off in 1643, and its 
leader was Vasily Poyarkov. After plundering the local population for furs and people, he 
eventually withdrew back north to Yakutsk. Once there he “confirmed that the Amur valley 
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could be a source of grain for the Tsar’s soldiers in Eastern Siberia.”122 As he said, “The 
warriors of the Sovereign will not go hungry in this land.”123 The next big Russian incursion 
came in 1650, and the leader this time was Erofei Pavlovich Khabarov. The Qing, who at this 
time was busy expanding into China, sent troops to kick Khabarov out, but they were unable 
to accomplish their objective. Nevertheless, because they eventually learned why the Russians 
expanded into the Amur, the native grain-producing Jurchens and Daurs were relocated away 
from the invaders by the Manchus. In 1658 the Qing armies were successful in expelling the 
Russians, as Onufry Stepanov, who continued the Russian Amur expansion after Khabarov, 
was killed after a Qing fleet hunted him down.124 
The Qing, however, was still not satisfied with the situation in northern Manchuria. A 
Manchurian governor wrote to the smallpox-stricken Shunzhi emperor in 1661 that “The 
migration to China of the Eight Banners, in combination with restrictions on immigration 
from China, had left Manchuria underpopulated, its cities falling into ruins, its field untended, 
[and] its perimeters without adequate defenses.”125 In short, “the entire region was vulnerable 
to conquest by Russians or Mongols.”126 
His warnings turned out to be well placed, as the Russians soon reentered the Amur region. 
The intruders this time were Cossacks fleeing from the oppression of the Siberian military 
governors or voevody. Siberia had always been vulnerable to Cossack rebellions, and from the 
1650s onward several such rebellions took place. Because the Amur’s wealth at this point was 
well known in Siberia, many of the rebellious Cossacks decided to flee there.  In 1665, one 
such group entered the Amur and settled in Albazin (a town that in 1650 was fortified by 
Khabarov127 but apparently taken over and later abandoned by the native Daurs after his 
departure in 1652). Thereafter they started collecting tribute from the local natives. This 
tribute they sent to Moscow, who because of this forgave them their crimes. In 1684 Albazin 
“became officially part of the Russian Empire.”128 
It was precisely at this time that the Qing expansion into China and Taiwan was completed, 
and so the Manchus could now redirect their attention and military forces from rebellious 
generals in southern China towards Russian intruders in northern Manchuria. The Russians 
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came under attack by Qing forces in 1685, and Albazin was captured by the Manchus. The 
Russians would not let themselves be expelled, however, and by the next year they had 
reentered the Amur and Albazin. The Manchus continued to attack, but the Russians would 
not back down. Both the Russians and the Qing then opted for finding a more peaceful way of 
solving this long-lasting dispute.129 
The Qing-Russian talks took place in July 1689 at the Russian fort of Nerchinsk. After 
fierce negotiations a border was agreed upon. The Russians were to hand over Albazin, but 
would in turn be allowed to sell Siberian furs in Beijing, thus opening up an additional “soft 
gold” marked. As Perdue writes, “food shortages in Siberia drew the Russian state to the 
Amur, but the primary importance of the fur trade led them to give it back to the Chinese [or 
Qing].”130 For the Qing in turn, having Russia as their northern neighbor was also beneficial. 
The natives and other peoples in this region were now forced to become either Qing or 
Russian subjects, increasing Qing (and also Russian) control in this fluid and ambiguous 
borderland. Perhaps most important of all, the Russians were forbidden to offer any kind of 
help to the Junghar Khanate in Eastern Turkestan,131 who by the late seventeenth century had 
become a serious Qing rival, and who from this point onward until the Qing annexation of 
Eastern Turkestan in 1755-59 drove Qing expansion first into Mongolia and Hami, then Tibet, 
Turfan, and Kokonor, and last into Central Asia. These expansions are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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3 Drama in Central Asia: The Qing, 
Russia, the Junghars, and the Qazaqs 
(1690-1820) 
We have now arrived at the main chapter of this thesis, which is where I discuss the Qing, 
Russia and their respective actions towards Central Asia in the eighteenth century. This 
period’s central event is the Qing expansion into Eastern Turkestan in the years 1755-59. 
Before the Qing conquest Eastern Turkestan was home to the Junghar Khanate, and an 
examination of the relationship between the Qing and the Junghars is therefore necessary for 
understanding the events of 1755-59. We shall see that the war between the Qing and the 
Junghars, which started in 1690, led the Qing to expand into Mongolia, Hami, Tibet, Turfan 
and Kokonor before they took Eastern Turkestan itself in the middle of the eighteenth 
century. These earlier conquests are in my thesis therefore treated as a part of the Eastern 
Turkestan expansion (Hami and Turfan is in fact a part of Eastern Turkestan). What goals did 
the Qing have with the destruction of the Junghar Khanate? How does the relationship 
between the Qing and the Junghars compare with the contemporary Russian relationship with 
Western Turkestan and the Qazaq nomads residing here? It is important to know that the 
Russians didn’t incorporate Western Turkestan into their empire in this period, although their 
influence there increased considerably (actual Russian expansion into Western Turkestan 
occurred only in the nineteenth century and will therefore not be discussed in this thesis). 
Perhaps the eighteenth century Russians abstained from expanding because they viewed the 
Qazaqs differently than the Qing viewed the Junghars? 
 
 
3.1 The Founding of the Junghar Khanate 
I will first examine the origins of the Junghar Khanate. The Junghars were a part of the Oyrat 
federation, a rubric applied to a group of Mongolian tribes that originally lived on the western 
side of Lake Balkhash132 in modern Kazakhstan. In the beginning of the seventeenth century 
the Oyrats consisted of the Derbets, Khoshots and Torghuts in addition to the Junghars. In 
1635 Batur Khun-tayiji (ruled 1635-53) took over as Junghar leader and it was under him that 
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the Junghars began to rise above the other Oyrat tribes and start the construction of the 
Junghar Khanate centered in Jungharia.133 
Like his Russian and Manchu counterparts, Batur Khun-tayiji faced many challenges in his 
quest for power. One of his many problems was the inadequacy of the Oyrats’ domestic 
resources. Like other state building nomads, Batur Khun-tayiji “had to rely on resources from 
outside, extracting wealth through trade, tribute, or plunder.”134 Russia became a major Oyrat 
trading partner, and at Tobol’sk in Siberia “the [Junghars] exchanged their horses, cattle, 
sheepskins, and furs for handicrafts made of cloth, leather, silk, silver, walrus ivory, and 
metal.”135 
Batur Khun-tayiji’s other major problem was that he was not directly related to Chinggis 
Khan. This made him unfit to the title of Junghar Khan, and he was therefore not able to 
conduct a proper unification of the Oyrat groups and put an end to the long tradition of inter-
Oyrat conflicts. In 1625-35 two Oyrat tribes had actually left Jungharia, the Khoshots 
traveling to Kokonor and the Torghuts emigrating to the Volga, and Batur Khun-tayiji was 
not able to make them come back.136 As we shall see, these two groups of Oyrats would later 
play significant roles in the drama of Qing and Russian state expansion.   
In 1653 Batur Khun-tayiji passed away, and this led to further Oyrat fragmentation. Batur 
Khun-tayiji had nine sons, and among them Sengge became his successor, but he was killed 
in 1670 by his own brothers. Another of Batur Khun-tayiji’s sons, Galdan (ruled 1670-97), 
who were at a lamasery in Tibet when Sengge died, traveled back to the Oyrats to assume 
leadership. He “became the great unifying leader the [Oyrat] Mongols needed”.137 To increase 
the amount of resources under his control, Galdan and his Oyrat forces in 1678-80 expanded 
into the oasis towns in the Tarim and Turfan regions (see Map 3). These territories supplied 
the Oyrats with agricultural produce, manpower, mercantile products, minerals and various 
advanced technologies.138 For example, the Junghars shipped many Turks from the Tarim 
Basin north to Ili to be farmers (these Turks came to be called Taranchi).139 When it came to 
the problem of Chinggis Khan and ancestral connections to him, Galdan received help from 
the Dalai Lama. In 1678 the Tibetan leader “bestowed upon Galdan the title ‘Boshugtu Khan’, 
khan by divine grace, essentially licensing Galdan to use the khanal title despite his lack of 
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Chinggisid ancestry.”140 By 1680, then, Galdan stood at the head of the powerful Junghar 
Khanate covering the entire region of Eastern Turkestan. 
 
 
3.2 The Junghars and the Qing Conquest of Eastern 
Turkestan (1690-1759) 
Let us pause briefly and look at the state of affairs in the beginning of the 1680s. The Qing 
Empire was now about to finish its southward expansion into China and Taiwan, and Galdan 
and his Junghars had established a strong state in Eastern Turkestan. To the northeast of the 
Junghars, however, the Khalkha Mongols in the north of Mongolia141 were in the midst of a 
civil war, as the two Khalkha “wings” battled each other. With the help of Qing and Tibetan 
mediation, in 1686 the Khalkhas eventually gave up their fighting. Inter-Khalkha hostilities 
soon resurfaced, however. In 1687 the Tüsiyetü Khan (who was part of the “eastern wing”) 
attacked the Jasaktu Khan (who was part of the “western wing”) and killed him. A brother of 
Galdan, Dorjizhabu, who had fought for the Jasaktu Khan also died. This led to a direct 
Junghar attack on the Khalkhas in 1688, resulting in the Khalkha tribes fleeing both north to 
the Russians and south to the Qing. Other Khalkhas surrendered to the Junghars. In 1690 
Galdan attacked again, but this time the Qing took offensive action. With the help of the 
previous year’s Nerchinsk treaty (see Chapter 2), the Russians had been persuaded to stay out 
of Junghar affairs. The Qing sent its forces into Mongolia, and they met the Junghar army at 
Ulan Butong. The Qing beat the Junghars, although Galdan was able to flee. In his absence, 
however, in 1691 the Qing emperor Kangxi (ruled 1662-1722) fully incorporated the various 
Khalkha Mongols into his state. Galdan and his Junghars, however, were still at large, but the 
war against them had been initiated.142 
The next Qing-Junghar battle came about in 1696, much further out in Mongolia at Jao 
Modo. Galdan was again moving into Khalkha territories, and Kangxi mobilized his forces to 
meet him. Galdan was defeated, and he lost most of his army.143 The next year, in 1697, 
Galdan died. Kangxi was satisfied and proclaimed: “Now Galdan is dead, and his followers 
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have come back to our allegiance. My great task is done.”144 Although Galdan certainly had 
died, Kangxi was wrong about the Junghars as a whole, as they certainly did not “come back 
to Qing allegiance” at this time. Still, the conflicts with Galdan led to the incorporation of 
Hami into the Qing state. In 1697, after the Junghars lost the confrontation at Jao Modo but 
before Galdan’s death, Hami’s ruler ʿAbdu-llāh took custody of Galdan’s son, whom he 
subsequently sent to the Qing capital. Later, after Galdan had passed away, ʿAbdu-llāh 
captured and transferred to the Qing another of Galdan’s sons. In 1698 “The Kangxi emperor 
[therefore] showed his appreciation by endorsing ʿAbdu-llāh’s rule and bringing Hami firmly 
into the empire.”145 Another piece of territory had been brought under Beijing’s control. 
So far the Qing war against the Junghars had led to the Khalkha Mongols and Hami being 
brought inside the Qing borders. The Junghars themselves, however, remained alive and well 
in Eastern Turkestan. A nephew of Galdan called Tsewang Rabdan (ruled 1697-1727) 
replaced his uncle as leader of the khanate, although it seems that he did not inherit the 
“Boshugtu Khan”-title that Galdan had used. Still, “He had obtained from the Dalai Lama the 
title of Erdeni Zoriqtu [Khun-tayiji] in 1694.”146 As James Millward frankly put it, “The 
Tibetan connection was critical to the growth and legitimacy of the [Junghar] state.”147 And it 
was precisely in Tibet that the next big confrontation between the Qing and the Junghars 
would occur.  
For the first eighteen years of his reign, Tsewang Rabdan maintained peace with the Qing 
but had hostile relations with the Qazaqs and the Russians. It was not until 1715 that he 
confronted the Manchus. This year he attacked Hami, but the Hami ruler supported by Qing 
troops forced him to pull back.148 Two years later, however, Tsewang Rabdan’s “cousin 
Chereng Dondub achieved the astonishing feat of marching an army through the [Kunlun] 
mountains and seizing control of Tibet.” (see Map 4)149 Tibet was certainly not part of the 
Qing Empire at this time, but the man in charge in Lhasa (a Khoshot Mongol called Lazang 
Khan) had been supported by Kangxi when he conquered the country in 1705. We have seen 
earlier that the Junghars, and Galdan especially, had made good use of his “Tibetan 
connection,” and a Qing supporter in charge in Lhasa was therefore bad news for Tsewang 
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Rabdan. Also, Lazang Khan was unpopular among many Tibetan lamas, who wanted 
Tsewang Rabdan to overthrow him.150 But the Junghar invasion in 1717 led Kangxi to react, 
and in 1720 the Tibetan capital was taken by the Qing. “With the support of both Tibetans and 
the Kokonor Mongols the [Qing]…successfully established its own claimant as the Seventh 
Dalai Lama. After the main armies…had withdrawn, the emperor ordered a strong garrison 
force left in Lhasa, thus inaugurating the period of direct [Qing] intervention in Tibetan life 
and politics.”151  
Qing expansion did not stop there, however. In the beginning of the 1720s, Turfan and 
Kokonor were conquered as well. Like the previous expansions into Mongolia, Hami and 
Tibet, the conquests of Turfan and Kokonor were an outcome of the conflicts between the 
Qing and the Junghars. As noted, Tsewang Rabdan attacked Hami unsuccessfully in 1715, but 
this attack was meant as a diversion for his forthcoming conquest of Lhasa. Nevertheless, 
Kangxi started planning for a counterattack westward from Hami. After many delays because 
of problems with the logistics, in 1717 the Qing forces finally moved, but because they 
learned of Tsewang Rabdan’s plans to take Lhasa the expansion was brought to a halt. 
Nevertheless, after Lhasa was secured in 1720 the westward expansion from Hami was 
resumed. This led to Turfan, the large oasis laying to the west of Hami, falling into Qing 
hands the same year.152 Then it was Kokonor that became the center of attention.  
The dominant ethnic group in Kokonor was the Khoshot Mongols. These were the same 
Khoshots that had fled from Batur Khun-tayiji and the Junghars into Kokonor in the 
seventeenth century. From their new homeland in Kokonor they had been able to secure the 
role as military protectors of the Tibetan government in Lhasa. The Qing’s occupation of 
Lhasa in 1720, however, put an end to that tradition. This resulted in discontent and civil war 
breaking out in Kokonor. The new Qing emperor Yongzheng (ruled 1723-35) more than 
anything feared a Junghar intervention in this civil war, and that the Kokonor Mongols and 
the Junghars would join in an anti-Qing alliance. But Tsewang Rabdan at this time was 
occupied with the Qazaqs and the Russians, so the intervention never came. The Qing, 
however, did intervene. In 1723 Qing forces invaded Kokonor and subdued the Khoshots, and 
from then on Kokonor was Qing territory.153 
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In 1723 the Qing and the Junghars had been at war for more than three decades, although 
as we have seen the major events can be narrowed down to the periods 1690-98 (when 
Kangxi turned hostile on Galdan and the Khalkha Mongols and Hami were incorporated into 
the Qing) and 1715-23 (when Kangxi and Yongzheng fought against Tsewang Rabdan and 
took Tibet, Turfan and Kokonor). But even after these Qing expansions, Eastern Turkestan 
itself was unincorporated. The Junghar Khanate still existed. In 1726, however, Yongzheng 
wanted to do something about that, as he now started preparing to expand into Eastern 
Turkestan as well. “In 1727 the [Qing] concluded the Treaty of Khiakta with Russia, settling 
the border between Siberia and Mongolia.”154 When the Qing had negotiated with the 
Russians in 1689, the Siberian-Mongolian border had been left unsettled because the 
Khalkhas at this time were still not Qing subjects. But as we have seen, in 1691 the Khalkhas 
were brought under the Qing umbrella, so that this question could now be laid to rest. 
Potential Russian cooperation with the Junghars had once again been eliminated, and the Qing 
could now continue with their expansions. In 1731 Turfan was repeatedly raided by the 
Junghars, and Yongzheng ordered the expansion to commence.155 Still, “Despite a total 
expenditure of almost 130 million taels, the forces assembled by [Yongzheng] were almost 
wiped out in 1731. A minor victory in 1732 allowed the [Qing] the opportunity to call a truce 
with the [Junghars] without a complete loss of face.”156 
The Qing-Junghar truce was formalized in 1739 when the next Qing emperor Qianlong 
(ruled 1736-95) and the Junghar khan Galdan Tseren (ruled 1727-45) stabilized the 
relationship between their two states. As with the Russians, the Junghars could trade with the 
Qing on a regular basis, and a border between the two states was drawn. The Qing-Junghar 
trade expanded greatly in the years that followed, and it was maintained until 1754, the year 
before Qing forces invaded Eastern Turkestan and put a permanent end to the Junghar 
Khanate.157 As it turned out, Galdan Tseren’s reign was to be the last stable ruling period for 
the Junghars. After he died in 1745 the khanate disintegrated, as internal fighting broke out. 
Amursana and Dawaci eventually emerged as the two main contenders for power, but after 
Dawaci won against Amursana, the latter in 1754 fled eastward and asked Qianlong to 
intervene. Qing forces together with Amursana then headed for Jungharia, which they took 
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without much effort in 1755. Most of the Qing forces eventually withdrew. Amursana then 
declared that he was to be the new Junghar khan and killed the Qing troops that were left. In 
1756 Qianlong therefore had to organize a second campaign into Jungharia, and this time he 
showed no mercy. Every Junghar was to be killed, the only exception being the old, women 
and children. These were to be converted into slaves. As if this was not enough, the Junghars 
also suffered a smallpox outbreak at this time, and many of them fled from Jungharia to 
Russia and elsewhere. The result of these events was that Jungharia, which formerly had 
housed around 1 million people, became practically empty of human inhabitants. The Qing 
also sent its armies south from Jungharia into Altïshar in 1758, and by 1759 they had 
conquered all of the oasis cities laying here. Thus the entire region of Eastern Turkestan was 
annexed by the Qing (see Map 5).158 Nine years after these events had transpired (1768), the 
new Qing territories were rechristened “Xinjiang” (“New Dominion”),159 which is the name 
that it is known by today. 
 
 
 
I have now described the Qing war against the Junghars, which lasted from 1690 until the 
Qing finally conquered the Junghar state itself in the middle of the eighteenth century. But 
why did the Qing need to destroy the Junghars and conquer Eastern Turkestan? What were 
their concrete motives? 
 
 
3.3 The Junghars as a Military Threat 
This may seem like a naiv question to ask. Since the Qing and the Junghars conducted 
warfare for so many years, didn’t the Qing need to eliminate its foe? Wasn’t security the most 
important aim? By this rationale the Junghar Khanate was a military threat, and the Qing 
answered this threat by destroying it. This may indeed be the most frequently encountered 
explanation for the conquest, and especially if the Qing Empire is viewed as the last in a long 
line of “Chinese” dynasties, and the Junghars in turn is seen as the last of the many nomadic 
groups that existed to the north and west of China. After all, one of the first theorems 
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encountered by the beginner student of Chinese history is that China (or more concretely the 
many dynasties that through history existed in the north of China160) had repeated unfriendly 
encounters with the nomads from Mongolia and Central Asia. This was the grand clash 
between the agricultural world of China and the pastoral world of the steppes. One of the 
earliest and most famous confrontations is perhaps that between the Han dynasty (206 BC-
220 AD) and the Xiongnu nomadic confederation. A few centuries later the Tang dynasty 
(618-906) would battle with the Türks.161 The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) also struggled with 
the nomads, as the Mongols proved themselves quite capable of raiding the Ming frontier and 
north China. More than once they attacked Beijing, and in 1449 the Ming emperor Zhengtong 
was even abducted by the Mongols.162 Thus we may read that since the Qing managed to 
permanently conquer the nomads, they terminated “2,000 years of defence [sic] problems.”163 
And it is true that both the Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors made references to 
past events when discussing the Junghars and Eastern Turkestan. After the Qing and the 
Junghars had fought at Jao Modo in 1696, Kangxi’s historians wrote that “Now the deserts are 
permanently cleared, and the border is secure. This is an achievement rarely seen in history 
books. The Han could not do this to the Xiongnu, Tang could not do this to the [Türks].”164 In 
1730 the Yongzheng emperor, as part of his famous text Dayi Juemilu (“Great Righteousness 
Resolving Confusion”), a compilation created in response to the discovery of anti-Manchu 
views expressed by a Hunanese teacher named Zeng Jing, justified Manchu rule on the 
grounds that they, unlike the Han and the Tang, had managed to incorporate all the peoples in 
the northwest into the polity. As is noted by Perdue, this was before the 1731 defeat of the 
Qing by the Junghars, so that he could say with some conviction that the Junghars also were 
(or soon would be) brought into the Qing.165 In the Qianlong reign, “After the initial victory 
over [Dawaci] in 1755…the Qianlong emperor ordered the compilation of three major 
geographic works on the new Qing territories, including large-scale maps, a large gazetteer 
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and a glossary of names.”166 In the last two of these works, one of the most important aims 
was to link the Eastern Turkestan now under Qing control with the Eastern Turkestan of Han 
and Tang times. Both of them put heavy emphasis on showing how this region was like under 
the Han, Tang and other eras.167 Finally, in 1792 Qianlong “began to style himself ‘Old Man 
of the Ten Complete Victories’ (Shi Quan Lao Ren), after an essay in which he boldly 
declared he had surpassed, in ‘Ten Complete Military Victories’ (Shi Quan Wu Gong), the 
far-reaching westward expansions of the great Han… and Tang…empires.”168 It would seem 
that there is good reason for including the Qing-Junghar conflict in the “China versus the 
nomads”-tradition, at least if based on the expressions of the Kangxi, Yongzheng and 
Qianlong emperors outlined above. 
But it is important to emphasize that there are many differences between the Qing conquest 
of Eastern Turkestan and the situation under earlier dynasties. In Han times, the Xiongnu 
nomads entered northern China, that is, the Han Empire itself, repeatedly in order to raid and 
acquire supplies.169 For the Tang as well, the Türks at several times attacked and penetrated 
the Tang borders. Their “incursions into the area around the capital [Chang’an] became so 
serious that late in 624 the city itself had to be placed under martial law.”170 The Ming, as 
described above, experienced Mongol incursions into their empire, resulting in attacks on 
Beijing and other misfortunes. In short, the nomad adversaries of the Han, Tang and Ming 
were a real and serious military threat. With the Qing and the Junghars it was different. 
Kangxi’s first battle with the Junghars in 1690 was instigated not by Junghar raids on Qing 
borders, but by Galdan moving into Mongolia. Even though Immanuel C. Y. Hsü once wrote 
that Galdan in 1690 “apparently…[had] the intention of taking [Beijing]”,171 Perdue argues 
that Galdan had no plans to attack the Qing capital at this time. When Galdan turned hostile 
on the Khalkhas in 1688, Galdan’s nephew Tsewang Rabdan (the same individual that would 
take over as Junghar leader after Galdan’s death in 1697) rebelled against and greatly 
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weakened his uncle. At the same time as Galdan fought in Mongolia, Tsewang Rabdan 
assaulted Hami, meaning that Galdan now faced enemies on two fronts. His army began to 
starve, and so the second march into Mongolia in 1690 was motivated not by conquering 
Beijing but by finding food and supplies to help keep his army alive. The Junghars in fact told 
the Qing that their expedition was directed at the Khalkhas only, and that they had no plans of 
advancing into Qing lands. To Kangxi, therefore, “Galdan’s forces had been reduced from a 
serious military threat to a starving remnant band deserving of pity.”172 Despite this 
understanding of the situation by Kangxi, however, he chose to attack Galdan anyway. 
Similarly, even though after 1715 the Junghars and the Qing fought at Hami and Turfan, and 
the Qing invaded Tibet and Kokonor for fear of Junghar influence in these areas, it remains a 
fact that the Junghars never assaulted the Qing heartland itself in this period. In fact, Hami 
and Turfan had once been a part of the Junghar Khanate, so that the conflicts in these oases 
could be seen more as the Junghars trying to push back the encroaching Qing than the Qing 
trying to defend itself against the Junghars. Also, Yongzheng’s defeat by the Junghars in 1731 
occurred after he had sent Qing forces to invade Jungharia, not because the Junghars invaded 
the Qing. Perhaps most importantly, during the 15 years of peaceful relations from 1739 to 
1754, there was great potential for the two states to work out a new relationship based on 
coexistence, as they regularly traded with each other and a Qing-Junghar border had come 
into existence. But as Perdue notes, “at the first sign of division among the [Junghars], the 
[Qing] rulers were ready to embrace the military option and return to their primary goal of 
eliminating the [Junghar] state”.173 Clearly then, there was something more than the Junghars 
just being a military threat to the Qing. I will now look at what ideological motives the Qing 
might have had with their expansion into Eastern Turkestan. 
 
 
3.4 The Junghars as Targets of a “Civilizing 
Mission” 
As discussed in the introduction, an urge to “civilize” the indigenous peoples of the area 
brought into the polity is one type of ideological motive for state expansion. If the expanding 
state’s dominant ideology or religion (Christianity, Islam, Marxism, Nazism etc.) preaches 
that it is a good thing if other foreign peoples are converted and incorporated into the mother 
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country, then we can say that to “civilize” is a potential motive for political expansion. For the 
European states this was often the case, with Christianity being the dominant ideology or 
religion (see Chapter 1). For imperial China Confucianism played much of the same role as 
Christianity did in Europe. The ancient Chinese term jiaohua, which William T. Rowe 
translates as “instructing and transforming or, more simply, ‘civilizing’”,174 was a well known 
phrase for the Qing elite, and perhaps even more important, in the Chinese political tradition 
“performing this function effectively was both a political imperative and the most reliable 
index of good governance.”175 The potential targets for this “transformation” included people 
both inside and at the edges of China. In short, a well-functioning Chinese imperial 
government was expected to civilize the peoples in and around the empire and make them 
follow Confucian rules of right and wrong.176 
And there are indeed instances of the Qing Empire striving to civilize parts of the polity in 
the eighteenth century, for example in the Guizhou and Yunnan provinces in the southwest. 
Although the southwest had come under Qing control after the Three Feudatories War ended 
in 1681 (see Chapter 2), the area was at first not governed in the same way as the other 
Chinese provinces. The system that was used was the indigenous headman (or tusi) system (a 
system that the previous Ming also had used), which meant that the native peoples living here 
were governed by headmen (usually, but not always of indigenous origin) that owed 
allegiance to the empire but existed outside of the Chinese bureaucracy. The headmen’s posts 
were hereditary and they were not rotated around the empire as the other officials were. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the Qing initiated a procedure known as gaitu 
guiliu (by Kent Smith translated as “replacing native chieftains with regular officials”),177 
which meant that these territories from then on were to be governed the same way as the other 
Chinese provinces and that the native peoples were to adopt the Han Chinese Confucian 
culture. The Yongzheng emperor especially was a champion of this drive, and in 1728 the 
Qing governor-general Ortai started conducting military expeditions in the southwest in order 
to eliminate the power of the tusi chiefs. Around the same time substantial amounts of 
Confucian schools were erected (according to Rowe, since the sixteenth century the “efforts at 
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incorporation of the [southwest] region by Chinese had featured the establishment of [these] 
Chinese language Confucian schools as one of their most basic components”),178 and 
particularly in Yunnan in the 1730s, when the famous official Chen Hongmou served as 
provincial treasurer in this region. Chen assumed his post in 1733, and when leaving office in 
1738 he left behind almost 700 Confucian schools, the greater share of which he himself had 
established.179 
Chen Hongmou once wrote that “In the task of governance, the mission of jiaohua 
assumes first priority”,180 and his efforts at erecting the Confucian schools in Yunnan testifies 
to the validity of this statement. It is highly significant then, that this same Chen Hongmou 
disapproved of the annexation of Eastern Turkestan in the 1750s. Right before the first Qing 
campaign into Jungharia in 1755, Chen Hongmou was governor of first Shaanxi and later 
Gansu province. These two provinces, laying near the front with Eastern Turkestan, were the 
areas responsible for supplying the armies that were to be used against the Junghars. A few 
months before the planned assault, Chen Hongmou wrote to the Qianlong emperor that 
instead of expanding into Eastern Turkestan it would be better “to devote our energies to 
strengthening ties of commercial interdependence between [Junghar] and Han so as to ensure 
peace and prosperity for both peoples.”181 In other words, he wanted to continue with the 
policy conducted after the Qing-Junghar truce of 1739. And Chen Hongmou was not the only 
Chinese official that protested against the expansion into Eastern Turkestan. After Amursana 
became Junghar khan in 1755, the Shaanxi-Gansu governor-general Liu Tongxun wrote that it 
would be best to pull out from Jungharia and instead erect defenses at Hami, which should be 
considered as the westernmost border of the empire in Eastern Turkestan. As he wrote, “The 
inner and outer boundaries must be demarcated”.182 In short, Chen Hongmou and Liu 
Tongxun both disagreed with the emperor on Eastern Turkestan policy. Furthermore, when in 
1757 Qianlong was touring south China, Jiangnan officials too voiced their dissatisfaction 
with the campaigns, as did Chinese jinshi students in 1760, who thought that the Eastern 
Turkestan conquest “was a cover for the expansion of despotic power, and that the military 
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colonies planned for the region were simply a coercive device to abuse human labor.”183 It 
seems then, that jiaohua was not a very strong motive for the conquest of Eastern Turkestan 
in 1755-59. This is further clarified if we examine how Eastern Turkestan was governed after 
the conquest was completed. 
The Qing government in Eastern Turkestan was an intricate and many-layered one, and a 
thorough description is not possible here.184 I will simply emphasize that the Qing did not 
strive to “civilize” or “transform” the native population after the conquest.  The Qing regime 
consisted of an overarching military establishment with three types of civilian administrations 
(the beg-,  jasak-, and junxian systems) located under it. As for the military establishment, the 
main Qing base was in New Qulja in the Ili region.185 The Eastern Turkestan military 
governor (the highest-ranked official in the entire region) together with the largest part of the 
army was stationed here. A military lieutenant-governor stationed in Urumchi had personal 
command over a smaller Qing force and assisted the military governor, and military 
councilors resided in Chuguchak, New Qulja and Kashghar (see Map 5).186 
The beg system was used for governing the sedentary Muslim Turks residing in Altïshar 
and Ili. As previously noted, the Junghars had moved large numbers of Turkic farmers from 
Altïshar to Ili in order to increase their state’s agricultural output, and the Qing did the same 
thing when they took over. The begs had originally been influential Turkic noblemen, but 
under the Qing they were converted into nonhereditary officials serving the imperial 
government. Even though this meant that the administration in Altïshar was greatly 
systematized and bureaucratized compared to what it had been earlier,187 the begs were still to 
remain Turkish. No steps were taken toward Chinese cultural assimilation.188 This was also 
the case for the rest of the Turks in Eastern Turkestan, as “the Qing maintained relations with 
                                                 
183 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 39-40; Alexander Woodside, "The Ch'ien-lung Reign," in Part One: The 
Ch'ing Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 245 (quote). 
184 For more in-depth accounts consult Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800," in Late Ch'ing, 1800-
1911, Part I, ed. John K. Fairbank, vol. 10, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), 58-90; Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 97-108; Perdue, China Marches West, 338-357. 
185 This name needs to be specified further. As Fletcher points out, there were two “Quljas” in Jungharia at 
this time: “Old Qulja,” which existed before the Qing takeover and was then just called “Qulja”, and “New 
Qulja,” which was built by the Qing in the beginning of the 1760s to be the new government center. Fletcher, 
"Ch'ing Inner Asia," 58. 
186 Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia," 58-60; Perdue, China Marches West, 338-340. 
187 James A. Millward and L. J. Newby, "The Qing and Islam on the Western Frontier," in Empire at the 
Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and 
Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 117-119. 
188 Newby, "The Begs of Xinjiang," 295-296. 
43 
 
the ‘ulama, or Islamic learned community, who handled certain judiciary tasks involving 
shari’ah law, which pertained in local matters.”189 
For Eastern Turkestan’s nomadic population, the Qing employed hereditary officials called 
jasaks. This system was already in use among the Qing’s nomadic subjects in Mongolia and 
Kokonor. Hami and Turfan also used the jasak system, separating them from the oases in 
Altïshar (were, as noted above, the beg system prevailed). Overall the jasaks were quite 
autonomous, but they still “served at the pleasure of the Qing government and could be 
replaced.”190 When it came to religion, among the Mongolian nomads in Eastern Turkestan 
(as well as Mongols residing elsewhere in the empire) it was Tibetan Buddhism that was 
promoted. Buddhist institutions in Jungharia received donations from the Manchus, and 
Tibetan Buddhism was central to the everyday culture of this region.191 
The last of the civilian systems used was the junxian (or Chinese civilian) system. Unlike 
in Yunnan and Guizhou, however, in which the goal was to implement this system for the 
entire provinces (the gaitu guiliu policy), in Eastern Turkestan it was used only where 
Chinese immigrants settled. This meant that it was only in Ili and in the eastern part of 
Eastern Turkestan (more precisely in Urumchi, Khitai, Barkul, Hami, and Turfan plus some 
additional territories) that this system was practiced.192 As I have emphasized above, other 
populations and areas in Eastern Turkestan were governed differently, and the Qing allowed 
and even promoted other distinct ideologies for these populations. The Confucian schools, so 
prominent a sign of the jiaohua policy conducted in the southwest, were largely absent in 
Eastern Turkestan. Curiously, in 1769 a Manchu general named Wenfu suggested that 
Qianlong should integrate Eastern Turkestan into the Confucian education system, including 
erecting such Confucian schools.193 But I have not come upon any evidence of this policy 
being implemented in the region, at least not for any of the non-Chinese populations. In fact, 
in 1765 Qianlong declared that top officials in Ili were to speak in Manchu only, not 
Chinese.194 To conclude, an urge to “civilize” the populations in Eastern Turkestan can’t have 
been a prominent motive for the Qing expansion into this region. 
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3.5 The Junghars as an Ideological Threat 
If the Junghars were not a direct military threat to the Qing, and the Manchus likewise had no 
need for civilizing Eastern Turkestan’s native population, then why did they conquer it? To 
find a plausible answer to this question it is necessary to look a bit more closely at the details 
surrounding the creation of the Qing state in 1636, and to examine the Manchu-Mongol 
relationship in the decades prior to and following this important event. 
As discussed earlier, Nurhaci, the father of the first Qing emperor Hong Taiji, started 
building the Manchu state at the end of the sixteenth century (see Chapter 2). The Mongols 
were close neighbors of the Manchus during these years, and the Mongols were to become 
crucial Manchu allies. First, on a strategic level, they became an important component of the 
Manchu army and an essential supplier of horses and livestock for the Manchus’ military 
expeditions. As early as 1619 Nurhaci wanted to recruit neighboring Mongols to march with 
him against his enemies.195 When Kangxi fought against Wu Sangui and the other Qing 
generals in 1674-81 (the Three Feudatories War), the Chahar Mongols (who were 
incorporated into the Qing when Hong Taiji defeated their leader Ligdan Khan in 1633) 
greatly aided the Qing military effort. After the Khalkhas were incorporated in 1691, they 
were to become important horse- and livestock suppliers for the Qing war against the 
Junghars. Also, when Yongzheng’s army was annihilated by the Junghars in 1731, Khalkha 
warriors engaged the Junghar army and forced them to pull back to Eastern Turkestan, greatly 
relieving the Qing emperor.196 Second, on a cultural level, the Mongols supplied the Manchus 
with a more “sophisticated” culture, most importantly in the realm of language. Before 1599 
Nurhaci and the other Manchus used Mongolian as their written medium, and when Nurhaci 
this year ordered that a Manchu written language be created, it was to be based on the 
Mongolian script. And it was most likely from the Mongolian language that the Manchus 
adopted their early political ideology and vocabulary. For example, like the Mongols, the 
Manchus looked on the many polities and peoples in East Asia as fundamentally equal (thus 
differing from the Chinese), and like the Mongols, the Manchus saw the state as made up of 
two spheres; one religious and one secular. It was also from the Mongols, not from China, 
that the Manchus took their early concept of emperor (khan in Mongolian, han in Manchu). 
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Furthermore, Manchu officials and princes were supplied Mongolian titles by Nurhaci, and 
Mongolian terms were applied in the spheres of law and taxation.197 
But how were these Mongols incorporated into the Qing? We saw in the previous chapter 
that the Qing state was a fusion of two rather distinct polities, the first being the Jin Khanate 
of Nurhaci and the second being the Chahar federation of Ligdan Khan. From Nurhaci Hong 
Taiji took over the role as Manchu leader, and from Ligdan Khan (after Hong Taiji defeated 
him in 1633) he inherited a distinct tradition of rulership that enabled him to rule the 
Mongols. As described earlier, this tradition preached that in order to lead the Mongolian 
people one would have to be a descendant of Chinggis Khan in addition to be a patron of 
Tibetan Buddhism. While descent from Chinggis had been a fundamental requirement for 
Mongolian rulers since late in the Yuan dynasty, ties to Tibetan Buddhism became important 
only in the sixteenth century. A pivotal event occurred in 1576, when the then dominant 
Mongolian leader Altan Khan (ruled 1543-83) issued an invitation to the Tibetan Buddhist 
elder Songnam Gyamtso to come to Mongolia. Once there Altan Khan announced that 
Songnam Gyamtso was a Dalai Lama (“universal teacher”). From this time onward Tibetan 
Buddhism became increasingly important for the Mongols.198 In fact, in “the late sixteenth 
century, some chiefs of the eastern Mongol tribes had turned their residences into centers of 
religious and literary activities with ties to the religious authorities in Tibet.”199 Ligdan Khan 
himself “sponsored a spectacular program of building monasteries, schools for the study and 
translation of religious works and publishing shops to reprint both Yuan-period texts and 
newly imported ones.”200  More specifically he was also a patron of the Tibetan Mahākāla 
cult which, it was said, enabled the patron to connect his mind or consciousness to the famous 
khans of previous times. He could also claim to be a chakravartin (a “wheel-turning king”) by 
worshipping to Mahākāla. In short, from the end of the sixteenth century onward, and 
particularly in the beginning of the seventeenth century under Ligdan Khan, the ideological 
bonds between the Mongolian tribes and the Tibetan Buddhist establishment became very 
strong.201 One can say that it was a distinct “political universe”202 of its own. 
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When Hong Taiji eliminated Ligdan in 1633, he took over the leading role (or placed 
himself at the center of) this political universe. First, surprisingly enough, he was fortunate in 
that he himself actually was of Chinggis decent.  Hong Taiji’s mother, Monggo-gege, who 
had married Nurhaci as part of diplomatic activity between him and a federation called Yehe 
in 1588, was a Chinggisid. Also, with the demise of Ligdan, Hong Taiji took from him a 
sacred Chinggis seal.203 Second, Hong Taiji began establishing closer ties with the Tibetan 
religious establishment. Those Mahākāla teachers that had previously given Ligdan the 
Chinggis consciousness arrived in Mukden (the contemporary Qing capital) to perform the 
same ceremony on Hong Taiji.204 Furthermore, in 1637 the Dalai Lama visited Mukden, and 
in 1638 Hong Taiji finished building a Yellow Temple in which to store a Yuan-period 
Buddhist statue, also previously owned by Ligdan. In addition to this, two years later the 
Manchu sovereign “received a letter from the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in which the 
two religious leaders recognized him as a bodhisattva and called him ‘Mañjuśrī-Great 
Emperor.’”205 Since “Chinggis [Khan] as a spirit…still ruled over all Mongols”,206 all 
Mongols were now in theory to become Hong Taiji’s subjects. 
As a step in this direction, from 1636 to 1638 Hong Taiji created the Mongol Eight 
Banners. As noted earlier, Nurhaci had built an Eight Banner organization in 1615. These 
banners consisted of both Manchus, Chinese and Mongols. Now, in 1636, the Chahar 
Mongols had been brought into the Manchu polity, and Hong Taiji had become a Mongolian 
khan in addition to Manchu ruler and an up-and-coming Chinese emperor. The Chahar 
Mongols, together with previously incorporated Mongolian peoples, were therefore given a 
separate Eight Banner institution (the Chinese followed suit in 1642, when the Chinese 
Martial Eight Banners were created).207 In addition to this, the Manchus began to intermarry 
with the Mongol nobility. This policy had been practiced by Nurhaci as well, and Hong Taiji 
developed it further. It was additionally expanded after the Manchus took China, and 
particularly under the Qianlong emperor and his successor the Jiaqing emperor (ruled 1796-
1820). As Perdue notes, this policy was very different from the previous heqin (“peace and 
kinship”) policy practiced by the Han and the Tang, in which Chinese emperors gave Han 
women to nomad chiefs in order to stop nomadic attacks. The Manchu-Mongol bonds were 
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much closer than that.208 In fact, “Mongol noblemen of the Eight Banner lineages were 
present for even the most carefully guarded shamanic rituals of the Qing imperial lineage, and 
they were represented on all military councils, campaigns, and history projects.”209 They 
“were as essential to the integrity of the empire as were the Manchu Eight Banner elites.”210 
The Qing state, in short, was as much a Mongolian polity as it was a Manchu or Chinese.  
It is against this background that we have to understand the Qing expansion into Central 
Asia. The Junghars were, after all, also Mongols. First of all, they spoke and wrote in 
Mongolian. Even though their language (both the spoken and the written) was slightly 
different from the one used by the Mongols to the east, it was close enough for outsiders to 
consider them as dialects.211 Also, the Oyrats firmly believed that their khan ought to be of 
Chinggis descent. As noted, since Batur Khun-tayiji was not a Chinggisid, he was unable to 
give himself the Khan title. In fact, in the fifteenth century, the non-Chinggisid Oyrat leader 
Esen (the one who abducted the Ming Zhengtong emperor) did just this, and he suffered death 
as a result.212 Finally, as we have seen, the Junghars were also closely integrated with Tibet. 
The Junghar unifier Galdan stayed at a lamasery in Tibet prior to his return to Jungharia in the 
1670s, and it was the Dalai Lama that helped him become Junghar Khan when he named him 
“Boshugtu Khan” in 1678. The Junghar Khanate was, in short, part of the same “political 
universe” that the Manchus entered in 1636. 
This makes the Qing urge to conquer the Junghars more understandable in at least two 
respects. First, we can understand the Qing expansion into Eastern Turkestan based on the 
following logic: From 1636 on, the Qing emperor became a Chinggis spirit who were to rule 
the Mongols. The Junghars were Mongols. They therefore had to be ruled by or incorporated 
into the Qing state. If seen this way, the Qing had purely ideological motives for their 
expansion into Eastern Turkestan. It would explain why many of the Qing’s Chinese officials 
(even those stationed in Gansu near the Qing-Junghar frontline, such as Chen Hongmou and 
Liu Tongxun) did not want the expansion to take place. After all, these Chinese officials 
probably did not see the Qing state as a Mongolian state.213  
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Further support for this perspective is found in the Qianlong emperor’s writings concerning 
the Torghut tribe of Oyrats and their emigration from the Volga to Jungharia in 1771. To 
recapitulate, the Torghuts were one of two Oyrat groups (the other was the Khoshots) who 
emigrated from Jungharia in the first decades of the seventeenth century. Whereas the 
Khoshots went to Kokonor and ended up as Qing subjects in 1723 (this is described earlier in 
this chapter), the Torghuts moved toward the Volga and eventually ended up under Russian 
domination (under the Russians the Torghuts were called Qalmïqs).214 “By the middle of the 
eighteenth century, however, they grew restive again under Russian taxes and military call-
ups, and faced increasing conflicts with Russian and Ukrainian settlers colonizing the Don 
and Volga areas.”215 They therefore decided to emigrate back to Jungharia, since they had 
found out that pasturelands were available in this region after the Junghar Khanate, in 
addition to most of the Junghars themselves, were no longer there. In 1771, after a long and 
hard journey, they were accepted by Qianlong as new imperial subjects.216 Qianlong was very 
happy to receive the Torghuts, and wrote that “With this, all the Mongol lineages are 
ministers (chen) of the Great Qing”,217 and that “of all the Mongolian tribes there are none 
who are not the Great Qing’s subjects.”218 It seems that the Qing rulers (or at least Qianlong), 
saw the Mongols as a people that ought to be ruled by the Manchus. 
But “pure” ideological goals alone may not be sufficient to fully explain the Qing expansions. 
While acknowledging the importance of the ideological motives discussed above, I believe it 
is also essential to recognize the potential ideological threat that the Junghar Khanate 
represented. As already discussed, the Manchus depended highly upon the Mongols (that is, 
the eastern Mongols incorporated in the seventeenth century) not just in a cultural sense (their 
language and ideology) but also in a very material sense (as soldiers and suppliers). The Qing 
emperors also knew that they needed to control Mongolia in order to keep the Russians at 
bay.219 The Junghars, by being so close to the Manchu and Mongol world while at the same 
time being independent,220 could appeal to the Qing Mongols in a way that made them 
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extremely dangerous. The Junghars were not Chinggis descendants and therefore could not 
compete with the Manchus in that arena, but other options were available. For example, when 
the Kangxi emperor fought the Three Feudatories War, we saw that the Chahar Mongols 
helped the Qing achieve victory. But Wu Sangui had actually contacted the Dalai Lama 
himself (the lands that he controlled in the south neighbored Tibet). These contacts, even 
though ultimately of no major consequence, led to the Dalai Lama not being very supportive 
of Qing attacks against Wu Sangui. Because of this “the Qing court experienced some 
difficulty in persuading its [Chahar] subjects and Khalkha allies to aid in the Qing side of the 
war.”221 If, for example, Tsewang Rabdan had been able to install a Junghar-friendly Tibetan 
government in Lhasa after he invaded the city in 1717, then the Dalai Lama could have 
persuaded the Qing Mongols not to fight for the Manchus, but perhaps even join the Junghars 
instead. Had this occurred, the Qing state would have been in an extremely dire situation. The 
Qing army would have become weaker, while the Junghar army would have become stronger. 
Also, horses (who were “always crucial for the survival of an empire and accounted for a very 
significant part of the budget”)222 and livestock would have been more difficult to acquire.  In 
1731 the Junghars actually pursued a strategy somewhat resembling the above example. Right 
after the Junghar khan Galdan Tseren defeated Yongzheng’s army that year, the following 
letter was sent to the Khalkha Mongols: 
 
We are of one religion, and dwell in one place, and have lived very well alongside 
each other…. Considering that you are the heirs of Chinggis [Khan], and not wanting 
you to be the subjects of anyone else, I have spoken with the Emperor of China about 
restoring Khalkha and [Kokonor] as they were before. But now the emperor of China 
wants to organize us, too, like Khalkha and [Kokonor], into banners and sumuns 
[companies], and grant us titles, wherefore I am going to oppose him by force of arms. 
If all goes well, I shall restore Khalkha and [Kokonor]. May it soon succeed! Move 
over to the [Altay], and dwell together with us in friendship as before. If war comes, 
we can face it together, and not be defeated by any man.223 
 
This strategy did not succeed in making all Khalkhas join the Junghar camp. As noted, it was 
actually Khalkha forces that made the Junghars retreat to Eastern Turkestan. Among other 
Khalkhas and Mongol groups, however, “the document–or, more precisely, the logic and 
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sentiment it captured–continued to stir insurrectionist talk and action”.224 As Crossley 
concludes, “The Qing court fought Galdan [Tseren] not only on the military front but the 
ideological front as well.”225 As I have argued in this chapter, it may even be that it was the 
ideological front that was the most significant. 
  
 
3.6 Other Motives 
As discussed above, I believe that the Qing expansion into Eastern Turkestan and the 
conquest of the Junghar Khanate must be understood as the Manchus striving to eliminate an 
ideological threat to their state. While acknowledging that this was the primary Qing aim, 
could there have been other (albeit more secondary) motives as well? I will now discuss 
commerce, resources and overpopulation as potential motives for the Qing expansion into 
Eastern Turkestan. 
As for commerce and resources, I believe that these were not fundamental Qing motives, 
though there certainly are evidence of commercial development and extraction of resources in 
the post-conquest period. The Qing government itself was actually involved in commercial 
ventures, which “included official trade of textiles for [Qazaq] livestock; agricultural 
reclamation; traditional Central Asian as well as new forms of taxation; garrison 
commissaries; and such measures as manipulation of exchange rates, renting out of 
government property, and investment of government funds with private merchants.”226 Also, 
from 1762 Chinese merchant immigration was promoted. Some of these were even financially 
supported by the government.227 In addition to this, the Qing dug up copper, gold, jade, lead, 
sulfur, nitre, and iron from Eastern Turkestan.228  
All of these economical undertakings, however, were initiated with the aim of making 
Eastern Turkestan self-sufficient, not with the aim of making the Qing state richer.229 In fact, 
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even with these economical enterprises in operation, the Eastern Turkestan administration 
could not operate on locally extracted resources alone. The Qing therefore had to spend 
thousands of extra silver taels annually in order to keep the government running. In 1795, for 
example, Eastern Turkestan received 845,000 taels from Beijing. As the nineteenth century 
unfolded expenses increased even more, since the Qing, in response to escalating regional 
conflicts, therefore needed to station more soldiers there. By the end of the 1840s, therefore, 
over 4 million taels were sent every year to Eastern Turkestan.230 The important point is that 
the Qing chose to “pay the bill.” This shows that commerce and resources was not what the 
Qing sought most at this time. 
But what about overpopulation? This motive might sound more probable than the previous 
two, in so far as we know that the Qing period as a whole saw a great increase in the Chinese 
population. Accurate data is hard to come by, however, since population surveys were always 
conducted with the aim of finding out how many potential taxpayers, soldiers, or laborers 
there were in a given place, not with the aim of recording the population for its own sake. And 
since the population figures of a particular administrative region in part was used to calculate 
how much taxes this region owed the central authorities, not only the civilian population but 
also local officials had an interest in underreporting to the central government.231 
Despite this practice, however, it seems safe to say that the Qing population was 
somewhere around 150 million by the beginning of the eighteenth century, and that this had 
grown to a little over 300 million by end of the same century.232 This is highly significant 
indeed, but for our purposes we need to find out how serious a problem population pressure 
was in the period before Eastern Turkestan was conquered in 1759. When did overpopulation 
become a concern to the Qing?  
A probable answer to this question is the second decade of the eighteenth century, since the 
Qing “from that point on gave strenuous attention to crafting a multifaceted set of activist 
policies to manage food supply.”233 As we have seen, the Qing state had earlier had serious 
problems with feeding its people in Manchuria. They found a temporary solution in 1644, but 
now the problem had caught up with them again. From after Qianlong took power in 1736, 
the challenge became even greater, and particularly in the early period of his rule. In the 
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1740s, for instance, the Qing population appears to have increased by as much as 45%.234 It 
seems then, that overpopulation was a problem for the Qing even before they expanded into 
Eastern Turkestan in the 1750s. 
Despite this, however, I still do not believe that overpopulation was what made the Qing 
conquer Eastern Turkestan. First of all, we have to remember that the Qing began battling 
with the Junghars in 1690, that is, two decades before the problem first surfaced. Second, if 
we look at what happened after 1759 we find that there were not that many Chinese farmers 
that went to Eastern Turkestan, at least not if we compare the numbers to the total population 
of the empire. When the nineteenth century began, the region was home to roughly 155 000 
Chinese farmers,235 and we saw above that the contemporary Qing population was slightly 
over 300 million individuals. The Chinese peasant immigrants in Eastern Turkestan, 
therefore, were only about 0.05% of the entire Qing population. This is certainly not much, 
especially if one considers that Eastern Turkestan’s surface area was 1,646,800 square 
kilometers, thus exceeding the territory of modern France  by more than three times.236 
Although Qianlong in 1760 in fact had suggested that Eastern Turkestan (more particularly 
Urumchi and Pijan) could help the overfilled Chinese provinces by functioning as an emigrant 
destination for the populations in these regions,237 this was, as we have seen, in the same 
period as he experienced criticism from officials and students who thought that the expansion 
should never have taken place. Qianlong’s recommendations should therefore be seen as an 
attempt at pleasing his domestic adversaries.238 Actually, while at this time it was the 
Jiangnan region that was “the most populous and most densely populated area of the 
empire”,239 it was, as we have seen, precisely from Jiangnan that some of Qianlong’s critics 
came. And it remains a fact that the largest part of the 155,000 peasant immigrants came not 
from Jiangnan, but from Gansu and Shaanxi in northwestern China.240 The Qing’s main aim, 
it seems, was to use the Chinese farmers in Eastern Turkestan as grain suppliers for their own 
military forces in the region, in part because it was very expensive to transport grain from 
interior China to Eastern Turkestan.241 In short, their role was to be similar to that performed 
by the Russian peasants moving to Siberia in the seventeenth century (see Chapter 2). This 
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role, it ought to be noted, they played very successfully, as Eastern Turkestan’s military 
establishment was well provided with grain in the post-conquest decades.242 
 
 
 
The Qing’s Eastern Turkestan expansion was, as we have seen, a process that lasted for 
almost 70 years, from 1690 until the final conquest in 1759, and the chief reason for its 
occurrence was the Qing’s insistence on annihilating the Junghar Khanate, a Mongolian 
political entity that was located in Eastern Turkestan. I have argued that the Junghar Khanate 
was not just a military rival of the Qing, but that it also was an ideological rival, and that we 
need to understand the Qing’s determined expansion with this last point in mind. 
While the Qing warred with the Junghars, however, the Russians too began to increase 
their presence in Central Asia. As discussed in Chapter 2, Muscovy conquered Kazan’, 
Astrakhan’ and Sibir’ in the second half of the sixteenth century. This led to them 
encountering a new people in the steppes to the south. This was the Qazaqs,243 and I will now 
examine the founding and development of the Qazaq Khanate.  
 
 
3.7 The Founding of the Qazaq Khanate in Western 
Turkestan 
The Qazaq Khanate, like the Russian state of Muscovy, rose to prominence simultaneously 
with the gradual crumbling of the Mongolian Golden Horde. We saw in the previous chapter 
that when the Golden Horde was destroyed, many new states and groups (the Noghays, 
Kazan’, the Crimea and Astrakhan’) sprang from its ruins. While this happened, however, in 
Western Turkestan yet another state was created, namely the Özbek Khanate. After its 
creation in 1420, it developed into the most powerful polity in the area. Nevertheless, around 
1465 the Özbek royal Janibek together with his brother Kirai split with the Özbek khan 
Abu’l-Khayr and built a new khanate centered on the Betpak-Dala Desert. In the following 
years its population increased to more than one million inhabitants, most of whom were 
Turkic nomads. Some of these came from the Dasht-i Qïpchaq, others came from the Özbek 
Khanate (at this time centered on the Mavarannahr region), and still others were natives of the 
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Betpak-Dala environs. There were also a few Mongol nomads coming from the Altay area 
(see Map 2). All of these groups eventually adopted the name “Qazaq.”244 
The Qazaqs were officially a Muslim people. Both Janibek and Kirai were Muslims, and 
this identity was acknowledged by the Islamic world. Despite this, however, they had much 
weaker ties to the religion than many other peoples in the area. They did not even have an 
official Islamic establishment (the steppe had no mosques or madrasahs, and the Islamic taxes 
on livestock and grain were not collected), and although Islam had existed in the Dasht-i 
Qïpchaq since 1043, the Qazaqs’ religion was also, and continued to be, characterized by pre-
Islamic practices such as worship to ancestors.245 
In the two centuries that followed its creation, the Qazaq polity expanded a great deal, 
including southward towards Tashkent and the cities lying along the Sïr-Darya. One of these 
cities, Turkestan (Yasy), became the Qazaq capital, and “by the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century they controlled most of present-day Kazakhstan.”246 But the Qazaqs had powerful and 
often hostile neighbors. In the seventeenth century, the two most important were the 
Ashtarkhanid dynasty to the south, centered on Bukhara, and the Junghar Khanate which, as 
we have seen, at this time rose to power in Eastern Turkestan (see Map 3). It was the latter of 
these two neighbors that caused the most trouble. In 1643 Batur Khun-tayiji led an invasion 
into southern Kazakhstan, as did Galdan in 1681-85. Tsewang Rabdan attacked the Qazaqs in 
1698-99 and in 1716 and 1718.247 The most serious Junghar attack, however, came in 1723. 
This year’s onslaught made the Qazaqs “flee west across the [Sïr-Darya] River. There, at what 
they considered a safe distance, they were taken completely by surprise when the [Oyrats] 
overran them later that year. Having lost the towns of Tashkent, [Turkestan], and Sayram and 
having found no safe haven from the [Oyrat] raids, the [Qazaqs] fled in panic farther west, 
approaching Khiva, Bukhara, and [Samarqand].”248 The Qazaqs, in short, were not capable of 
holding the Junghars at bay on their own. They therefore began searching for an external ally 
that could aid them against their Mongol adversary. The best candidate for this role seemed to 
be the Russians to the north, and in 1687 Tauke (ruled 1680-1718) therefore dispatched his 
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first ambassador to Peter I and Ivan V (co-tsars 1682-96) and asked that the Russians help the 
Qazaqs prevail against the Junghars.249 
  
 
3.8 The Qazaqs Submits to Russia (1690-1740) 
A Qazaq request for Muscovite military assistance was actually not an unprecedented event. 
In the late sixteenth century, when the Russians and the Qazaqs had their first diplomatic 
exchanges, the Qazaqs were driven by the hope of acquiring Russian military support. But the 
Russians put a high price on their aid. They demanded among other things that the Qazaqs 
maintain a hostile relationship with the Sibir’ Khanate to their north (which at this time was at 
war with Muscovy) and with Bukhara to their south. The Qazaqs also needed to capture the 
Sibir’ khan Kuchum who, as noted, in 1582 fled from the Russians when Ermak Timofeevich 
took over his capital. These terms were not accepted by the Qazaqs, and formal Russian-
Qazaq contact was subsequently cut.250 
For most of the seventeenth century, when the Qazaqs were pressured by the 
Ashtarkhanids and the Junghars, the Russians had no formal exchanges with their neighbors 
to the south. During these years “they were preoccupied with the Siberian fur trade, and so the 
[Qazaq] Steppe was of relatively little importance.”251 Nevertheless, as the century closed, 
several factors helped make the Russians more attentive to what was happening in Central 
Asia. First, as described in Chapter 2, when the Muscovites established themselves in Siberia 
there developed Russian forts there, and at the end of the century these forts had come so 
close to the Qazaqs that the latter attacked them. Also, the Russians at this time came to 
depend on Qazaq support with regard to their commerce with Bukhara.252 The Russians had 
actually traded with Bukhara before this time as well, but at the end of the seventeenth- and 
beginning of the eighteenth century, because of a general growth in the economy of Russia, 
the Russians wanted to strengthen their commercial links not only with Central Asia, but with 
India and Persia as well.253 On the Russian side the Bukharan commerce had usually been 
operated from Astrakhan’ and Kazan’, but because the Torghuts (the Oyrat tribe briefly 
encountered in the Qing part of this chapter) arrived and blocked these trading routes, 
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Astrakhan’ and Kazan’ were eventually superseded by Tara and Tobol’sk,254 and in order to 
get to Bukhara from there the Russians needed to travel across Qazaq-dominated territories 
(see Map 3). This made the trade difficult to maintain, as the Qazaqs sometimes attacked the 
caravans in order to obtain its commodities and people. Also, the escalating Qazaq-Junghar 
conflict did not make the commercial opportunities any better for the Russians.255 In fact, by 
the late 1720s they understood “that without some form of outside assistance the [Qazaq] 
steppe would be entirely overrun by the aggressive [Qalmïqs] [or Junghars], thus threatening 
not only Russian [commercial] expansion but Russia’s position in southern Siberia as 
well.”256 This made the Russians more willing to ally themselves with the Qazaqs than what 
had previously been the case. It also made them build a series of forts to serve as a defensive 
line against the steppes. The first fort, Omsk, was finished in 1717, then followed 
Semipalatinsk in 1718 and Ust’-Kamenogorsk in 1720. Orenburg, originally built in 1737 and 
later moved slightly westward (the first Orenburg fort was renamed Orsk), became the capital 
of the region (see Map 4).257 The Russians eventually built so many forts that the Qazaqs 
became anxious, since the pastureland at their disposal decreased as a consequence of this 
policy.258 
To summarize, we have seen that the Russian Empire and the Qazaq Khanate, after their 
brief and unsuccessful contacts in the late sixteenth century, developed stronger incentives 
towards allying with each other in the late seventeenth century. The Qazaqs wanted Russian 
military assistance in order to keep the Junghars in check, whereas the Russians wanted the 
Qazaqs to stop assaulting their forts and caravans. In the 1720s the Russians also came to 
realize that if they did not help the Qazaqs hold back the Junghars, the latter could eventually 
threaten their own imperial enterprise in Siberia and Central Asia. In short, the stage was now 
set for a new chapter in Russian-Qazaq relations. 
Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to take a quick look at the Qazaqs’ 
political organization in this period. Rather than having one single powerful khan as their 
leader, the Qazaqs were split up into three separate “hordes”, namely the Senior (also called 
“Great” or “Greater”) Horde, Middle Horde and Junior (also called “Small” or “Lesser”) 
Horde (see Map 4). These three hordes were created in the sixteenth century, but they were 
not always independent political units. Powerful Qazaq khans such as Haq Nazar (ruled 1538-
                                                 
254 Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, 148. 
255 Olcott, The Kazakhs, 29-30. 
256 Olcott, The Kazakhs, 25-27, 31, quote from 26. 
257 Olcott, The Kazakhs, 26-27, 30, 32-33. 
258 Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, 167-168, 172. 
57 
 
80) and Tauke were able to control all of the three hordes because of their personal military 
capabilities. After Tauke died in 1718, however, no other Qazaq khan appears to have been 
capable of doing so. At this time, therefore, “the khan of each horde assumed the powers of 
sovereign ruler in his own territory, including the right to negotiate treaties with foreign 
powers”,259 and the Russians now saw the Qazaqs as organized into three separate states.260 
These three polities were found in Semirech’e (the Senior Horde), central Kazakhstan (the 
Middle Horde), and western Kazakhstan (the Junior Horde).261 In the eighteenth century, the 
Russians dealt primarily with the Junior and Middle Qazaq hordes. The Senior Horde resided 
to the south and east of the two other hordes, and they established contact with the Russians 
only in the nineteenth century.262 
The first of the three Qazaq hordes to submit to Russia was the Junior Horde. Its 
“proximity to the Russian frontier and the example of the military and material benefits that 
other neighboring peoples, such as the [Qalmïqs] and Bashkirs, derived from their ties with 
Russia prompted the khan of the [Junior] Horde, [Abu’l-Khayr], to approach the Russian 
authorities. His first offer of a military alliance with Russia in 1718 was not immediately 
welcomed”,263 however. The Russians, as noted, only changed their minds after the Junghar 
offensives against the Qazaqs in the 1720s. When Abu’l-Khayr in 1730 asked the Russian 
empress Anna (ruled 1730-40) to be allowed to become a Russian citizen, therefore, his 
request was accepted, and in 1731 Abu’l-Khayr swore an oath promising to be a subject of 
Russia. In the years that followed, the Middle Horde leaders Semeke (in 1732), and Abu’l 
Muhammad and Ablai (in 1740), also promised to be loyal Russian citizens.264 By 1740, then, 
the Junior and Middle Qazaq hordes had apparently been successfully brought into the 
Russian Empire. In fact, “the traditional historiography regards 1731 as the year when the 
[Qazaqs] became Russian subjects.”265 
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3.9 Russia and the Qazaq Hordes in the Eighteenth 
Century (1740-1820) 
This assertion, however, is not accurate, since the Qazaqs, and even the Russians themselves, 
did not see the former as being a genuine part of the Russian polity. From Abu’l-Khayr’s, 
Semeke’s, Abu’l Muhammad’s, and Ablai’s point of view, the oaths they swore to Russia 
were first and foremost “designed to bolster…[their own] positions in intertribal wars.”266 
Neither were they looked on as permanent treaties. In 1733, only one year after his 
submission to Russia, Semeke (ruled 1718-33) launched an attack on the Bashkirs, “Russian 
subjects with whom he had sworn to live in peace.”267 When these same Bashkirs shortly 
thereafter revolted against the Russians, Abu’l-Khayr (ruled 1718-48) allied himself with 
them and attacked Orenburg.268 Also, after the Qing expanded into Eastern Turkestan in the 
1750s, Ablai (ruled 1733-81) established connections with the Manchus and submitted to 
them as well, and when in 1773 the Cossack Pugachev organized a huge rebellion against the 
Russian Empire (according to Khodarkovsky this uprising was so big that it “would send 
shock waves across Russia and Europe”269) the Junior Horde khan Nur Ali (ruled 1748-86), 
who was the successor of Abu’l-Khayr, allied himself with Pugachev in the first year of the 
rebellion.270 Clearly, the Qazaq chieftains did not see themselves as true subjects of Russia at 
this time. 
More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that the Russians by and large agreed with them, since 
they neither by administrative nor military means managed to gain full control of Kazakhstan 
at this time (it was actually only in 1822-84 that the Russians genuinely conquered Western 
Turkestan.)271  
 It should be said, however, that the Russians had some influence over the Qazaqs also in 
the eighteenth century. For example, in the course of this period they gave themselves the 
right to decide who was to be khan of the two hordes. Traditionally the Qazaqs themselves 
had elected or approved their khans,272 but the Russians now began to extend their influence 
over this process. For example, when Abu’l-Khayr died in 1748, it was the Russians who 
insisted that his son Nur Ali become the new Junior Horde khan, despite the fact that many 
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Qazaqs had their allegiance elsewhere.273 Furthermore, when Nur Ali passed away in 1790 
and yet another khan had to be elected, his brother Er Ali (which was the candidate favored 
by Russia) was chosen after the Russians “dispatched to the election site a sizable contingent 
of regular and irregular…troops armed with artillery.”274  
The situation was similar in the Middle Horde, since after Semeke died in 1733, it was the 
Russians who gave the title of khan to his successor Abu’l Muhammad.275 Furthermore, when 
Abu’l Muhammad eventually also died and his title was passed on to Ablai (whose initial 
coronation happened without Russian interference), the latter came into a quarrel with 
Catherline II (ruled 1762-95), who “claimed that since Semeke’s oath of fealty in 1732 the 
dignity of khan rested with St. Petersburg and not with the [Qazaqs] themselves.”276 
Despite this limited meddling in Qazaq politics, however, a fully fledged conquest, such as 
happened in Eastern Turkestan in 1755-59, clearly did not happen in Western Turkestan. At 
the end of the century Russian maps still depicted the imperial border as running “north of the 
Ural and Mias rivers just south of Orsk and Troitsk over Omsk and thence along the [Irtïsh] 
River to the [Altay] mountains”,277 and Qazaq traders doing business in Orenburg and 
elsewhere were taxed as foreigners (see Map 5).278 
  
 
3.10 Similarities and Differences between Russia and 
the Qing 
It was in the eighteenth century, then, that Russia and the Qing for the first time diverged 
from each other in their engagement with Central Asia, since up to this point they had 
followed roughly the same pattern. In the first place, it was the expansions in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries that made their states come into direct conflict with the Central 
Asian peoples. The Manchus constructed a state in Manchuria, conquered the Chahar 
Mongols and expanded south to take control of China by defeating and replacing the Ming 
dynasty. Then, in 1690, conflict broke out between the Qing and the Junghars in Mongolia. 
The Russians, in turn, took control over the Golden Horde successors Kazan’ and Astrakhan’, 
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and subsequently marched east across the Ural Mountains through Siberia. Then, in the late 
seventeenth century, the Qazaqs launched their first attacks on the Russian forts in this region.  
After these initial confrontations there followed a turbulent half century, especially so for 
the Qing, the Junghars and the Qazaqs. As seen above, the Qing and the Junghars engaged in 
many battles in this period, as did the Junghars and the Qazaqs. The Russians and the Qazaqs 
did not have as hostile a relationship as the Qing and the Junghars, but as noted, the Qazaqs 
did attack Russia’s Siberian forts as well as their trading caravans traveling in the steppes. 
They also launched an attack on the Torghuts (who were subjects of Russia) in 1726.279 
Following this period of turbulence both the Qing and the Russians managed to build a 
more formal relationship with the states in Central Asia. The Qing emperor Qianlong and the 
Junghar khan Galdan Tseren came to terms with each other in 1739, as did the Russians and 
the Qazaqs in 1731-40. But here the similarities stop. For where the Qing a few years later 
used the first occurrence of disorder in the Junghar camp as an opportunity to expand into 
their territory and destroy their state, the Russians lingered on in Siberia and did not expand, 
at least not in the eighteenth century. This was despite the fact that the Russians knew that the 
Qazaq hordes were not very centralized political entities. Ivan Kirilov, the founder of 
Orenburg and a representative of Anna, in 1734 wrote of the Qazaqs that they “have a Khan 
in name only, for he has no power over them, for affirming himself in his khanic rule or for 
turning his subjects away from the [khun-tayiji] (leader) over to Russian power.”280 It is true 
that the Russians spoke of the Qazaqs (that is, those belonging to the Junior and Middle 
hordes) as their subjects after 1740,281 but so did the Qing of the Junghars after 1739,282 
almost twenty years before the actual expansion took place. From 1759 onward, however, the 
Qing could more legitimately claim that the peoples in Eastern Turkestan were their subjects, 
since they now had their own administration in place there. As we have seen, however, this 
was not the case for the Russians in Western Turkestan. 
Why didn’t the Russians conquer the Qazaqs in the eighteenth century, like the Qing did 
with the Junghars? It is not easy (perhaps impossible) to answer this question in full. I believe, 
however, that it is possible to increase our understanding of this question by focusing on Qing 
and Russians motives in Central Asia. Previously I argued that the Qing conquered the 
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Junghars because the former perceived the latter as an ideological threat. Since both of them 
capitalized heavily on Tibetan Buddhism and at the same time were military adversaries, the 
relationship between the two became particularly problematic. This is the reason, I believe, 
that the Qing did not hesitate when given a chance to expand into Junghar territory. It follows, 
then, that the Russians and the Qazaqs did not have the same kind of relationship as the Qing 
and the Junghars had. In fact, although the Russians and the Qazaqs can be said to have been 
military adversaries, they nevertheless were not coreligionists; the Russians were Orthodox 
Christians whereas the Qazaqs, as we have seen, were Muslims. I will now examine how 
Russia adopted Orthodox Christianity. 
 
 
3.11 Russia and its Ideological Heritage 
Christianity came to Russia (or Kievan Rus as it was known then) in the late tenth century. At 
this time Vladimir, the leading prince in Kievan Rus, converted, and he subsequently insisted 
that the rest of the country follow in his footsteps. “From the beginning, the princes, with the 
cooperation of early churchmen, made use of the new faith to underscore the sanctity of 
princely power.”283 It was the Byzantine form of Christianity that served as the most 
significant model for Kievan Rus, and after the famous 1054 split between the pope in Rome 
and the patriarch in Constantinople, “Rus Christianity was part of the Orthodox world.”284  
As we saw in Chapter 2, Kievan Rus was destroyed by the Mongols in the early thirteenth 
century, but this did not mean the destruction of Rus Christianity. The Mongols actually 
showed a remarkable degree of tolerance for it, as they even permitted the founding of a 
bishopric in the Golden Horde capital Saray. Rus Christianity was therefore able to survive 
the Mongol period, and when Muscovy in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries 
emerged as the dominant Russian hegemon, the Muscovite rulers too capitalized on Orthodox 
Christianity in order to increase their own power.285 This was particularly the case after Ivan 
the Terrible became tsar of Muscovy in 1547. Ivan was actually the first ruler in Russia to 
receive this designation. The leader of the coronation ceremony was none other than 
Metropolitan Makari, the head of the Orthodox establishment in Russia, and the Orthodox 
Church now began preaching that the sovereign of Moscow “was the legitimate successor to 
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the former lands of Kievan Rus”286 and that he was “the last great Christian monarch.”287 
Later in the century, after Ivan’s death, the patriarch in Constantinople declared to Fedor 
(ruled 1584-98) that “Your great Russian Tsardom, the third Rome, surpasses all in piety; you 
alone in all the universe are referred to as the Christian Tsar.”288 
This strengthened Christian identity also showed itself in the interactions between 
Muscovy and the successors of the Golden Horde who, as we shall see, were all Muslim 
polities. Nevertheless, in his analysis of Muscovy’s capture of Kazan’, Perdue claims that 
religion played a subordinate role. He believes that the relationship between Muscovy and 
Kazan’ was characterized by pragmatism and cooperation before 1552, and that the former 
conquered the latter because Kazan’ disintegrated from the inside. Among the inhabitants of 
Kazan’ there were some who favored Muscovite interference and some who resisted it. In 
short, “There never was a united Turkic-Muslim front against Orthodox Moscow.”289 
Khodarkovsky, on the other hand, argues that “the ideological divide between Moscow and 
the Muslim world…[became] more pronounced [after 1547], and [that] the issues…[were] 
articulated more frequently in terms of the religious differences.”290 It certainly is true that 
Ivan IV received support from the Orthodox Church when he defeated Kazan’ in 1552. 
Metropolitan Makari himself was highly enthusiastic, and Ivan subsequently rewarded his 
supporter by building a cathedral in Kazan’, by giving the city its own archbishop and by 
trying to convert its population to Christianity. “He also granted monasteries and churches 
land within the city and beyond.”291 Perdue claims that the issue of religious conflict was 
emphasized only at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, when 
Orthodox clerics tried to put in place a justification for the previous annexation.292 Ivan’s 
policies immediately after the Kazan’ takeover would seem to contradict this argument, 
though. 
It is true, however, that the majority of Muslims in Russia continued (and were allowed) to 
practice their religion as before. In the Russian view, as long as the Muslims did not resist the 
empire, it was not necessary to carry out an inquisition.293 Ivan IV outlined the reason for this 
                                                 
286 Moss, A History of Russia, 135, 208, quote from 208. 
287 Moss, A History of Russia, 208. 
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292 Perdue, China Marches West, 81-82. 
293 Vladimir Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," in Imperial Russia, 1689-1917, ed. Dominic 
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approach in a letter that he sent to the Noghay chief Ismail in 1563. It had earlier been 
revealed that seven Astrakhan’ nobles had worked in secret with Kazy (another Noghay chief) 
and the Crimean Khanate, both of whom were enemies of Muscovy, and Ismail protested to 
Ivan that these nobles were allowed to stay in Astrakhan’. Ivan wrote to Ismail: 
 
We cannot remove them because [when] we took [Astrakhan’] and appointed our 
governors there, we gave our word to the [Astrakhan’] nobles that they would be 
protected. And we are the Christian sovereign, and they are Muslims. If we remove 
them and keep them away from [Astrakhan’], the [Astrakhan’] people might run away, 
and in the foreign lands some would say that we did not keep our word, that the two 
faiths could not live in peace, and that the Christian sovereign was destroying the 
Muslims. And it is written in our Christian books that it is not allowed to convert to 
our faith by force; people should have whichever faith they wish. And then God will 
decide in the future whose faith is right and whose is not; a man cannot judge this. 
And in our lands there are many people of the Muslim faith who are in our service, 
and they live in accordance with their law.294 
  
As Khodarkovsky notes, Ivan probably wrote this letter “With one eye on the Ottoman sultan 
and another on the rapidly growing number of Muslims in his own domain”,295 and we can 
see that his concern for a pan-Islamic alliance against Muscovy was definitely present. In fact, 
Ivan knew that Süleyman I, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, just a few years earlier had 
tried to forge such an alliance. Around 1550, not long before Ivan’s seizure of Kazan’, the 
Muscovite leader was told that Süleyman had contacted Ismail and suggested that his 
Noghays join forces with Astrakhan’, the Crimea and Kazan’ against Russia. As Süleyman 
wrote, “we are all Muslims and we should all stand united against Moscow”.296 Ismail told 
Ivan that he had declined the request, however, and in 1551 Muscovy was able to install a 
khan of their own liking in Kazan’. The proposed alliance, in short, did not materialize at this 
time.297 
Besides these fears of a hostile Muslim alliance, however, the letter reveals something else 
about the Russian tsar: He still looked on himself solely as a Christian ruler. Despite the fact 
that Russia now had many Muslim subjects, Ivan IV did not become a Muslim monarch. In 
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296 Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, 105. Khodarkovsky cites PDRV, 8:263-267. 
297 Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, 105. 
64 
 
fact, although the Russian state by and large allowed its non-Orthodox peoples to continue 
their religious practices, it is a fact that “conversion to Christianity was always 
encouraged”,298 at least in the case of the Muslims. For example, Peter I (ruled 1682-1725) 
proclaimed that Orthodox converts were exempt from paying taxes for three years, did not 
have to serve in the military, and were exempt from labor in government factories. In 1713 it 
was declared that any Muslim noble living in the provinces of Kazan’ or Azov who did not 
become Christians would lose his lands and the Orthodox serfs working on them. In 1731 and 
the years that followed, the Russians converted around 8000 Muslims in the provinces of 
Nizhnii Novgorod and Kazan’. In 1740-44, 418 of Kazan’s 536 mosques were destroyed by 
the Orthodox, and in 1742 the building of new ones was banned.299 
In short, from the time of Kievan Rus until after the Qazaqs became “subjects” of Russia in 
1731-40, it was Orthodox Christianity that was the sole official religion in the empire. 
Although the Russian state had incorporated many Muslims in the course of these centuries, it 
had nevertheless not incorporated Islamic ideology.300 The only religious establishment that 
really mattered for the tsar, then, was the Orthodox one. Furthermore, this was an 
establishment that the Russian government managed to bring under firm imperial control. The 
highest figure in Rus Christianity had usually been the patriarch in Constantinople, and back 
in the days of Kievan Rus it was he who decided who was to be the metropolitan of Kiev, the 
top local cleric. After Muscovy’s entrance on the scene, however, Constantinople gradually 
lost control over its coreligionists in Russia. First, as early as 1325 Moscow became the new 
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residence of the metropolitan. Then, in 1448, the Russians for the first time appointed their 
own metropolitan independent of Constantinople.301 Finally, in 1589 they got their own 
patriarch as well, and although “the touchy question of the relative powers of tsar and 
patriarch [still] remained”,302 this was a contest that would be won by the tsar. To take a few 
examples, in 1649 the state “forbade sermons to offend the honor of any boyar [noble] or 
official, created a Monastery Bureau…to oversee litigation against church people, and 
confiscated church lands located in the cities.”303 In 1764, Catherine II (ruled 1762-96) would 
annex the remaining church lands as well.304 
  
 
3.12 Russian Goals in Western Turkestan 
The Russian Empire, then, did not follow “the Qing incorporative religious policy”.305 
Whereas the Manchus tried to co-opt Tibetan Buddhism after obtaining Mongol Buddhist 
subjects, the Russians stuck to their original Orthodox Christianity and did not try to co-opt 
Islam after obtaining Muslim subjects. While it is difficult to say which of these two strategies 
was the most advantageous, the Qing had one clear disadvantage as compared to the 
Russians: By making themselves so dependent upon a religious authority located so far away 
from their own realm (the Dalai Lama in Lhasa), they put themselves in a difficult situation. 
This was particularly the case when it turned out that the powerful Junghars too used Lhasa as 
a religious resource. The Russians, however, faced a less complicated situation. When they 
and the Qazaqs ran into each other at the end of the seventeenth century, the Russian 
government already dominated the Orthodox Church, which was the only church of any 
significance to them, and which was a church that the Muslim Qazaqs did not aspire to take 
over. The Qazaqs in Western Turkestan, then, could not in any possible way threaten the 
Russians the way that the Junghars threatened the Qing. 
What, then, did the Russians hope to achieve in Central Asia? The Russians actually had 
the same goal in this region as they had in Siberia: They wanted to get rich. The man who 
founded Orenburg, Ivan Kirilov, meant that Central Asia could be to the Russians what 
America was to the Iberians. Whereas Spain and Portugal extracted resources from overseas, 
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Russia would be able to get salt, lead, valuable stones, silver, gold, and additional metals from 
Central Asia. “Kirilov drew a grandiose picture of caravans from Khiva, Bukhara, and India 
bringing exotic goods, and Bukharan, Indian, Armenian, and even European merchants 
coming to trade in Orenburg.”306  
Unlike in Siberia, then, where the Russians extracted animal furs directly from the native 
inhabitants, in Central Asia they were to obtain the items they needed by commercial means. 
Kirilov actually recommended that the Russians simply conquer Central Asia,307 but as we 
have seen above, this did not happen in the eighteenth century. Although Anna most likely 
gave the idea some thought, security for Siberia and commerce with Asia were what the 
Russians prioritized most at this time, and the arrangement with the Qazaqs was advantageous 
in both respects. In fact, even before Orenburg was finished in 1737, “[Kirilov], led by 
[Qazaq] guides, established a Russian caravan trade with Khiva, Bukhara, and Tashkent.”308 
It is no wonder, then, that the Qazaqs did not share the fate of the Junghars in the 
eighteenth century. The profit-seeking Russians had other aims in Central Asia than had the 
Qing. The Qing was willing to sacrifice lots of resources in order to conquer the Junghars. 
The conquests themselves cost millions of taels,309 and as we have seen, the Manchus’ 
administration in Eastern Turkestan was also very expensive to run. But all of these expenses 
were justified because the Junghars were looked on as a threat to the very core of the empire.  
The Russians, however, did not see things the same way. Since the Qazaqs did not threaten 
their ideological establishment and since their main aim in Central Asia was commerce, the 
Russians were less willing to conquer the Qazaqs. A complete incorporation of the Qazaq 
steppe would have been expensive, just as it was to the Qing, and the Russians knew this and 
therefore hesitated to do it.310 If they could continue with their commercial activities in 
Central Asia without conquering the Qazaqs, this was a cheaper and therefore better method 
for the Russians. I believe this is the main reason why the Russians, unlike the Qing, did not 
expand into Central Asia in the eighteenth century. 
When Russia finally did annex the Qazaqs and the rest of Western Turkestan in the 
nineteenth century (more precisely in 1822-84), it was in an environment that differed much 
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from the eighteenth-century world. Russia was now emerging as an industrial power, and it 
began competing with other European states for colonies, influence, and prestige.311 While it 
would have been very interesting to see exactly what motives were behind these expansions 
as well, they nevertheless occur outside of the chronological framework of this thesis, and I 
will therefore not explore these events further here. 
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4 Conclusion: The Qing, the 
Junghars, and Tibetan Buddhism 
In this thesis I have tried to find out what the Qing Empire hoped to achieve by annexing 
Eastern Turkestan in the eighteenth century. What motives guided this conquest? As we have 
seen, prior to the Qing expansion it was the Junghar Khanate that held sway in Eastern 
Turkestan. Did the Qing expand because the Junghars was a strong military power that 
needed to be eliminated, or were they eager to initiate a “civilizing mission” in Central Asia? 
Perhaps they thought that Eastern Turkestan’s territories could help them with the heavily 
increasing population in China, or that it would be a good recipient for Qing commerce? 
Maybe they desired to get hold of its resources? 
The Qing Empire that conquered Eastern Turkestan was built in the early seventeenth 
century in Manchuria, and the two men responsible for this feat were Nurhaci and Hong Taiji. 
Nurhaci began his unification of the Manchus in 1583, and Hong Taiji (the successor of 
Nurhaci) initiated the Manchu Qing Empire in 1636. Before the Qing began to interact with 
Central Asia, however, they first conquered China. In 1644 they launched their armies against 
the Ming dynasty, and 39 years later, in 1683, China and Taiwan was in the hands of the 
Manchus.  
In my view, this expansion was the product of two motives, the first being ideological and 
the second having to do with overpopulation. As for the ideological motive, the Manchus had 
a desire to conquer the Ming dynasty and overtake its “Mandate of Heaven.” The Chinese had 
for several thousand years thought that their rulers required the support of heaven in order to 
stay in power, and that this support depended on him (or her) being a just and morally upright 
sovereign. But if a ruler converted to evil ways, his Mandate would be removed and put in the 
hands of a different person, so that the evil ruler might someday be replaced. The Manchus 
thought that heaven had selected them to be the new rulers of China.  
What they also thought, however, was that the Ming conquest would terminate a critical 
Manchu problem, which was that their state had a larger number of subjects than Manchuria 
was able to support. The Northeast was simply not rich enough for the Qing population. This 
was a problem that the Manchus knew they had, and which indeed was solved after they took 
China and Taiwan in 1644-83. 
There were other challenges waiting for the Manchus, however. Two centuries earlier, in 
Russia, the old Mongolian polity known as the Golden Horde had begun to fall apart, and 
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from its aches would rise a number of states, one of which was the Russian state of Muscovy. 
In 1581, two years before the Manchus initiated their political project in the Northeast, the 
Muscovites traversed the Ural Mountains and began their expansion into Siberia. By the 
1640s they had gotten as far as the Pacific Ocean. 
This expansion by the Russians, although chronologically very close to the Manchu 
conquest of China, was nevertheless very different as far as motives are concerned. The 
Russians had no ideological reasons for taking Siberia, nor any troubles with their food stores 
in Russia. They took Siberia because it had resources, most significantly furs, which the 
Russians wanted to get their hands on. When they later expanded from Siberia into 
Manchuria, however, they were in fact looking for food as well, though this was to go to its 
existing establishment in Siberia, not to its subjects in the Russian homeland. 
As the Russians drifted into the Northeast, however, they triggered Qing alarms. The 
Manchus were now in the midst of their China campaign, but they nevertheless tried to expel 
the Russians in the far north of their realm. It was not until the 1680s, however, after the 
Manchu hold on China and Taiwan had been consolidated, that a solution was worked out 
with Russia. The Qing and Russian states produced an agreement in 1689, called the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk, which divided the Qing and Russian realms in this region. The Russians left 
Manchuria, but could in return sell furs in China. Since furs was the very reason for their 
presence in Siberia, this was an acceptable compromise for Russia. 
In the meantime, however, another state had emerged on the scene, and this was a Central 
Asian state. In the course of the seventeenth century the Junghar nomads had built a polity in 
Eastern Turkestan, and by 1680 the whole of this region was under their control. In 1688 this 
Junghar Khanate, led by Galdan, sent its forces eastward against Mongolia and the Khalkha 
Mongols. On this occasion the Qing did not respond, but after settling their issues with the 
Russians in 1689 (whom because of this treaty also had to promise not to aid the Junghars), 
the Qing was freer to do as it pleased. When the Junghars invaded again in 1690, therefore, 
the Qing attacked and defeated them. 
It would take many decades, however, before the Qing actually defeated the Junghar state 
itself. Although they beat them in Mongolia in 1690 and later in 1696, and although Galdan 
perished in 1697, the Qing did not move into Central Asia until 1755-59. By 1759, however, 
they had destroyed the Junghars and in the process brought Eastern Turkestan into the Qing. 
What were the Manchus’ motives? 
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In view of the many battles that the Qing and the Junghars engaged in, one would initially 
think that this was about security. The Junghars were destroyed because their armies 
threatened the Manchus. But because the Junghars had actually not invaded China itself, and 
because the last one and a half decades of Qing-Junghar intercourse (1739-54) was quite 
peaceful, I believe that this explanation is not good enough.  
It is also unlikely that a “civilizing mission” was the motive, since the post-1759 years 
does not show much evidence of the local population being “transformed” or “civilized.” 
They imported Chinese government institutions into Eastern Turkestan, it is true, but this was 
only in a limited area, and in any case was only to govern the Chinese who immigrated to the 
region. The natives had their own government establishments, which was different from the 
Chinese one.  
But perhaps it was these Chinese immigrants that were the cause of the conquest? Was 
overpopulation again one of the primary motives, as it had been when the Manchus took 
charge of China? The Qing population had in fact grown enormously during the eighteenth 
century, but because so few Chinese actually left China for Eastern Turkestan at this time 
(155 000 souls out of a population of 300 million Chinese lived in the region in 1800), I do 
not think that overpopulation was an important motive. 
But could it be that the Manchus wanted the same as the Russians in Siberia, namely 
resources? As we saw previously, the Russians took Siberia because of the furs that it 
contained. Eastern Turkestan had resources as well, and the Qing obtained gold, iron, silver, 
and other commodities after the conquest. But because these resources were extracted with 
the goal of paying for the local Qing establishment, which in any case continued to rely on 
payments from China in order to stay afloat, I do not think that resources was why the 
Manchus annexed Eastern Turkestan either. The same is the case with commerce. 
The reason they did expand into Eastern Turkestan, I believe, had to do with the Junghar 
Mongols, and the fact that they not only threatened the Qing in a military way, but also in an 
ideological way. In fact, the Qing and the Junghars were both closely associated with and 
critically dependent upon the same ideological source, which was the Tibetan Buddhist 
establishment in Tibet. Tibetan Buddhism was important for the Manchus because it helped 
them keep the Mongols (not the Junghar Mongols in Eastern Turkestan, but the Mongols in 
Mongolia and Manchuria) loyal to their state. Furthermore, because these Mongols also were 
an inalienable part of the Qing ruling core (perhaps as inalienable as the Manchus 
themselves), maintaining Mongolian loyalty towards the Qing was of utmost importance. 
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As for the Junghars, Tibetan Buddhism was important because it had helped grant political 
legitimacy to its leaders, first and foremost Galdan but also Tsewang Rabdan (the successor 
of Galdan). Galdan had in fact been in Tibet himself, and had it not been for the Dalai Lama 
titling him “Khan by Divine Grace,” he could probably not have called himself “khan” at all 
(all of these titleholders had to be in the family of Chinggis Khan, something that Galdan was 
not). 
The Qing and the Junghars, then, were both military and ideological competitors at the 
same time. For example, if the Junghars in some way could have managed to make the Dalai 
Lama and his Tibetan establishment disapprove of the Qing as a Buddhist state, they could 
have hurt the Manchus badly without actually having done any physical action, and had they 
followed this up with a military attack, the Manchus would have been in a difficult position. I 
believe this is why the Manchus were so resolute in destroying the Junghars. 
I also think that this argument is strengthened by looking at what Russia did with the 
Qazaqs in Western Turkestan. As we shall see, the Russian state’s experience with this area 
was in some ways similar to the Qing experience with Eastern Turkestan. As the Qing had 
first taken China and thereafter (in 1690) come in conflict with the Junghars, so the Russians 
had first taken Siberia and thereafter (at the close of the seventeenth century) come in conflict 
with the Qazaqs. As the Qing and the Junghars experienced several hostile engagements for 
the next 30-40 years, so the Russians and the Qazaqs did the same. But unlike the Qing, which 
conquered Eastern Turkestan in 1755-59, the Russians did not conquer Western Turkestan in 
the eighteenth century. They were content with the lands that they controlled in Siberia, built 
defensive structures along the Central Asian border, and although certainly increasing their 
influence in Western Turkestan, they did not conquer it. Why so? 
I believe the reason is that unlike the Qing and the Junghars, the Russians and the Qazaqs 
did not capitalize on the same ideological source. The Qazaq Khanate had from the beginning 
been a Muslim state (though their pre-Islamic culture was still showing through), whereas the 
Russian state had from the beginning been an Orthodox Christian state. The Russians and the 
Qazaqs, in short, were not ideological rivals. I believe that had the same been the case with 
the Qing and the Junghars, the Qing would probably not have conquered Eastern Turkestan in 
the eighteenth century either. 
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Appendix: Rulers and Reigns312 
 
Manchu Rulers to 1820313 
Chinese Reign Name  Personal Name  Reign Period 
Tianming   Nurhaci   1616-26 
Tiancong   Hong Taiji   1627-35 (as Latter Jin khan) 
Chongde   Hong Taiji   1636-43 (as Qing emperor) 
Shunzhi   Fulin    1644-61 
Kangxi   Xuanye   1662-1722 
Yongzheng   Yinzhen   1723-35 
Qianlong   Hongli    1736-95 
Jiaqing   Yongyan   1796-1820   
 
Junghar Rulers314 
Name    Reign Period 
Khara Khula   ?-1635 
Batur Khun-tayiji  1635-53 
Sengge   1664-70 
Galdan   1671-97 
Tsewang Rabdan  1697-1727 
Galdan Tseren  1727-45 
Tsewang Dorji Namjal 1746-50 
Lama Darja   1750-53 
Dawaci   1753-55 
Amursana   1755-57 
 
Russian Rulers to 1820315  
(The Romanov dynasty from 1613) 
Name    Reign Period 
Dmitri Donskoi  1359-89 
Vasili I   1389-1425 
Vasili II (the Blind)  1425-62 
Ivan III (the Great)  1462-1505 
Vasili III   1505-33 
Ivan IV (the Terrible)  1533-84 
Fedor    1584-98 
Boris Godunov  1598-1605 
Fedor II   1605 
Pseudo Dmitri I  1605-06 
Vasili Shuisky  1606-10 
 
 
                                                 
312 This name is taken from a similar (though not identical) appendix from Perdue, China Marches West, 569. 
313 Based on Perdue, China Marches West, 569; Willard J. Peterson, ed. Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 
1800, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2002), XXV. 
314 Based on Perdue, China Marches West, 569. 
315 Based on Moss, A History of Russia, 568-569. 
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(The Romanov dynasty) 
Mikhail Romanov  1613-45 
Alexei    1645-76 
Fedor III   1676-82 
Ivan V    1682-96 (co-tsar) 
Peter I    1682-1725 
Catherine I   1725-27 
Peter II   1727-30 
Anna    1730-40 
Ivan VI   1740-41 
Elisabeth   1741-61 
Peter III   1761-62 
Catherine II   1762-96 
Paul I    1796-1801 
Alexander I   1801-25 
 
Qazaq Rulers to 1820316  
(The Junior and Middle hordes from 1718, and the Bukei Horde from 1801) 
Name    Reign Period 
Janibek   1465-80 
Buyunduk   1480-1511317 
Qasim    1511-23 
Mamush   1523 
Tahir    1523-33 
Buidashe/Ahmed/Tugun 1533-38 
Haq Nazar   1538-80 
Shigai    1580-82 
Taulkel   1586-98 
Esim    1598-1628 
Jangir    1628-80 
Tauke    1680-1718 
 
(The Junior Horde) 
Abu’l-Khayr   1718-48318 
Nur Ali   1748-86 
Er Ali    1791-94 
Ishim    1795-97 
Ayshuak   1797-1805 
Jhan-Tore   1805-09 
                                                 
316 Based on Olcott, The Kazakhs, 4, 8, 10-11, 13-14, 24-26, 31, 34-35, 39-44, 46-53, 61-62. When the first 
and/or last year of a reign is not specifically stated and it has not been possible to precisely calculate it from the 
text, I have provided what I believe to be the most plausible year, and these years are written in italics.  
317 It is possible, however, that Kirai (the brother of Janibek) also ruled for a few years in this period. As 
Olcott states, “The official Soviet history of Kazakhstan considers Janibek the first [Qazaq] khan, holding that, 
upon Janibek’s death in 1480, Kirai’s son Buyunduk…was elected his successor. Other sources maintain that 
Kirai was the first elected khan, ruling until his death in 1488, when he was succeeded by Buyunduk.” Olcott, 
The Kazakhs, 8. 
318 On page 26, Olcott states that Abu’l-Khayr’s rule ended in 1749, but on page 34 she writes that he was 
killed in 1748. Since she also states that Nur Ali (Abu’l-Khayr’s successor) took over the latter’s office in 1748, 
I’ve therefore set 1748 as the last year of Abu’l-Khayr’s rule. Olcott, The Kazakhs, 26, 34-35. 
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Shir Ghazi   1812-24 
 
(The Middle Horde) 
Semeke   1718-33 
Abu’l  Muhammad  1733-71 (co-ruler) 
Ablai    1733-81 
Vali    1781-1817 
Bukei    1816-18 (co-ruler 1816-17) 
 
(The Bukei Horde) 
Bukei    1801-23 
Jangir    1817-45 (co-ruler 1817-23) 
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